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"Let there be progress, therefore; a widespread and eager progress in every century and epoch, both of individuals and of the general body, of every Christian and of the whole Church, a progress in intelligence, knowledge and wisdom, but always within their natural limits, and without sacrifice of the identity of Catholic teaching, feeling and opinion."—ST. VINCENT OF LERINS, *Commonit*, c. 6.

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LETTER OF HIS HOLINESS POPE PIUS X TO CARDINAL GIBBONS.

[Translation.]

Dilecto Filio Nostro Jacobo
Tit. Sanctae Mariae Trans
Tiberim S. R. E. Presb. Card.
Gibbons, Archiepiscopo Balti-
morensi, Catholicae studio-
rum Universitatis Washing-
toniensis Cancellario.

To Our Beloved Son James
Gibbons, Cardinal Priest of
Santa Maria in Trastevere,
Archbishop of Baltimore,
Chancellor of the Catholic
University of America.

PIUS PP X.

Dilecte Fili Noster, Salu-
tem et Apostolicam Benedicti-
onem.

Plane nec praeter opinio-
nem nec praeter spem acci-
derunt majora in dies incre-
menta istius Catholicae studio-
rum universitatis, quae Wash-
ingtoniae, in urbe Foedera-
tarum Americae Civitatum
principe, Catholicorum exci-
tata stipe, et ab Apostolica
Sede omni aucta jure legiti-

PIUS X POPE

Beloved Son, Health and
Apostolic Benediction.

By no means surprising or
unexpected is the steady and
vigorous growth of the Catho-
lic University which, located
at Washington the capital city
of the American Republic,
built up by the offerings of
the Catholic people and in-
vested by the Apostolic See
with full academic authority,

mo, ibidem doctrinae in omni scientiarum divinarum et humanarum genere magna parens assidet. Perspecta enim fide et munificentia Catholicorum ex America nulla Nobis inerat dubitatio quin, iisdem adnitentibus, illud recens conditum christianae sapientiae domicilium brevi eam assequeretur nominis gloriam ut inter clariora istius gentis gymnasia haberi posset. Pergratae tamen litterae fuerunt quas nuper Nobis misisti hujus rei nuntias non solum quia jucundius fuit ex te ipso rem cognoscere, sed etiam quia id confirmasti quo nihil optabilius Nobis erat; id est in illa alma studiorum sede elegantiam doctrinae optime conjungi cum fidei integritate, ita ut ad bonas artes non minus quam ad religionem adulescentes et clerici et laici informantur. Est igitur cur ex animo gratulemur, tibi quidem in primis, Dilecte Fili Noster, cujus sollertiae providentiaeque hanc ducimus tribuendam laetabilem rerum conditionem, tum etiam ceteris Foederatarum Americae Civitatum Episcopis, qui tibi in Lyceo moderando egregiam navant operam, tum denique

is now become the fruitful parent of knowledge in all the sciences both human and divine. Knowing as We do the faith and generosity of the Catholics of America, We had not the slightest doubt but that through their efforts this newly established home of Christian wisdom would quickly win for itself an honorable name and a place among the foremost institutions in your country. None the less gratifying, however, was the information on this subject which you lately sent Us by letter, not only because it was highly pleasing to have the statement from you personally but also because you gave Us assurance in regard to a matter We have so deeply at heart, to-wit, that in this noble seat of learning the finest culture is thoroughly united with purity of faith, in such wise that the students both clerical and lay are trained in the truths and practice of religion and in the various branches of science as well. We have therefore good reason to congratulate, first of all you, Beloved Son, to whose solicitous and provident care We ascribe the

ejusdem Rectori ac Doctoribus Collegiatis quorum doctrina ac diligentia tam praeclaros efferunt fructus.

At vero quominus Washingtoniensis Academia prosperis omni ex parte rebus utatur efficiunt adhuc atque obstant, ut ipse fateris, rei familiaris angustiae. Hinc necessitas adeundi piam fide-
lium liberalitatem; quam cum experti jam sitis, per alios decem annos advocare iterum cogitatis in saluberrimi operis subsidium. Collaudamus, ut alias jam fecimus, providentem voluntatem vestram, eamque frugiferam Instituto futuram portendit prompta ac facilis ad largiendum Catholicorum ex America indoles: quin etiam confidimus vel eos ipsos quorum largitatem tenuitas contrahit, symbolam tamen suam ultro collaturos; eo vel magis quod ex hoc lyceo tanta christianae humanitatis emolumenta sperare licet, quanta Catholicorum consueverunt offerre scholae, quibus

prosperous condition of the University, then also the other Bishops of the United States who so ably assist you in the administration of the University, and finally the Rector and the Professors whose teaching and devotion to their work have produced such splendid results.

But, as you yourself acknowledge, the University is still hampered and its full development retarded through lack of resources. Hence the necessity of appealing to the loyal generosity of the faithful of which you have already received striking proof and which you would again call to the aid of this highly useful institution during a further period of ten years. We praise, as on a former occasion We praised, your foresighted design whose success and beneficial result for the University is guaranteed by the prompt, responsive liberality of your American Catholics; nay, We are confident that even those whose readiness to give is limited by the slenderness of their means, will nevertheless gladly contribute their share—the more so because from the Univer-

lex est mentem doctrinae studiis excolere, animos virtute confirmare.

Occasione utimur ut idem vos hortemur quod jam decessor Noster f. r. Leo XIII qui die XIII junii MCM I ad te rescribens, Americae Septentrionalis Episcopis suadebat ut e suis quisque delectos aliquos clericos, quorum ingenii vis discendique ardor plus quidam facerent spei, Washingtoniae Academiae instituendos traderent. Nos autem pro certo habemus, Dilecte Fili Noster, episcopus eosdem studiose Nobis obsecuturos in re quacum singularum dioecesium exploratissima utilitas est conjuncta. Iidem enim clerici sacerdotio initiati et ad sua reversi quodcumque libeat episcopis sacerdotale munus illis conferre, ea perficient diligentia quam excellentiorem in ipsis praestabunt doctrinae opes quas uberiores Washingtoniae acquisierint.

sity as the source may rightly be expected all those advantages for Christian education which flow out through our Catholic schools to enrich the intelligence with knowledge and to strengthen the heart in the practice of virtue.

We take this occasion to renew the exhortation given by Our Predecessor of happy memory Leo XIII who, in waiting to you on June 13, 1901, urged the Bishops of North America to send to the University from each diocese some specially chosen clerical students whose ability and eagerness for learning would give more than ordinary promise of success in their studies. We are quite certain, Beloved Son, that the Bishops will readily comply with Our express wish in this matter from which each diocese will derive beyond doubt the greatest benefit. For these clerics elevated to the priesthood and returning to their respective dioceses will, in any position which the Bishops may assign them, discharge their duties with an earnestness all the greater because of the deeper and wider knowledge they will have acquired at Washington.

Suam quoque laudem hic a Nobis habeant Religiosarum Familiarum Moderatores, qui suorum Collegia tironum circum Washingtoniensem Universitatem considerunt, quasi quamdam filiorum coronam qui Almam Matrem complectuntur. Hujus enim propinquitatis ea sunt commoda quod ex una parte Collegiorum conspectus Academiam egregie exornat eidemque opinionem auget; ex altera religiosis alumnis, qui domi studia doctrinarum colunt, Academia et praestantiorum magistrorum copiam praebet et cultum exquisitiorem si qui Athenaeum celebrare velint. Quae probe considerantes Nos, quibus maximae est curae ut qui in sortem Domini vocati sunt sanctitatis et doctrinae cultu evadant *operarii inconfusibiles, recte tractantes verbum veritatis*, Collegia ejusmodi singulari benevolentia complectimur, ceterosque Religiosos Antistites hortamur ut idipsum, omni nempe remoto regularis disciplinae detrimento, efficiendum curent.

Illud quoque jucundum fuit abs te accipere Episcopos Uni-

In this connection also We bestow deserved praise upon the superiors of the Religious Orders whose houses of study are established at the University, forming as it were a circle of devoted children around their cherished mother. This grouping indeed is of mutual advantage: the Colleges add to the adornment of the University and enhance its prestige, while on its part the University affords the religious who, along with their own studies, may follow its courses, opportunity to profit by the teaching of the ablest professors and to attain more thorough knowledge. Carefully considering these relations and concerned above all that those who are called to the service of the Lord should by growth in holiness and knowledge become *workmen that need not to be ashamed, rightly handling the word of truth*, We regard these Colleges with special favor and We exhort the Superiors of other religious orders, while preserving intact their regular discipline, to establish similar institutes.

It was furthermore a pleasure to learn from you that

versitatis moderatores rationem, provido consilio, iniisse qua, incolumi sane religiosa disciplina, vel ipsis Religiosis Foeminis faciliora redderent altioris doctrinae beneficia quibus utilius versentur in puellis instituendis.

Quae hucusque scribendo persequuti sumus in aperto ponunt Nos laudatae Catholicae Academiae incrementis summa quadam voluntate studere. Plane enim intelligimus quantum ad Catholicam doctrinam vulgandam, defendendam, ad provehendam gentium humanitatem possit Catholica studiorum universitas quae quidem celebritate atque auctoritate floreat. Tueri igitur ipsam et provehere idem prorsus esse videmus ac perutilem dare operam cum religioni tum civitati.

Auspex divinorum munerum Nostraeque testis benevolentiae Apostolica sit Benedictio quam tibi, Dilecte Fili Noster, Rectori, Doctoribus alumni Washingtonianae Universitatis amantissime in Domino impertimus.

the Bishops who are directors of the University had, with prudent foresight, devised a plan whereby the teaching Sisters also, without in any way slackening the observance of their religious rules, might more easily enjoy the advantages of university study and thus attain greater efficiency in their work of educating girls.

What we have thus far set forth makes it plain that We are fully determined on developing the Catholic University. For We clearly understand how much a Catholic university of high repute and influence can do towards spreading and upholding Catholic doctrine and furthering the cause of civilization. To protect it therefore and to quicken its growth is in Our judgment, equivalent to rendering the most valuable service to religion and to country alike.

As an omen of God's favor and a token of Our own goodwill accept the Apostolic Benediction which We most lovingly in the Lord bestow upon you, beloved son, as also upon the Rector, the professors and the students of the Catholic University.

Datum Romae apud S. Petrum in praeludio diei sacrae Infanti Deo a tribus Sapientibus adorato, anno MCMXII. Pontificatus Nostri nono.

Given at St. Peter's, Rome, the eve of the Epiphany, 1912, the ninth year of Our Pontificate.

PIUS PP X.

PIUS X, POPE.

THE DIVINE INFANT.¹

And the angel said to them: fear not; for, indeed, I bring you tidings of great joy, that shall be to all the people: for this day is born to you a Saviour, who is Christ the Lord, in the city of David. And this shall be a sign unto you. You shall find the infant wrapped in swaddling clothes and laid in a manger. *Luke II, 10-12.*

This night, the world over, every true Christian heart rejoices, for in these momentous hours was solved at Bethlehem the mystery of human life that from time immemorial mankind had been wearily trying to understand. In one way or another mankind for untold centuries had been seeking on earth or in itself the key of the dread enigma, in power or pleasure, in philosophy, knowledge, or wealth, but in vain. Neither Cæsar nor Pan, neither Plato nor Aristotle nor Mammon, had been able to lift the heavy veil that shrouded from the anxious gaze of man the hard secret of pain and sorrow, of poverty and injustice, of universal evil and endemic wrong, above all the grim secret of death that humbled equally all men and remained for all the one inscrutable thing.

But this night, twenty centuries ago, the long-silent heavens opened and in a poor village of a despised and hated land, amid the most wretched surroundings, the Word of God, the Second Person of the Blessed Trinity, came down to earth in the form of a little infant, miraculously born of an humble virgin; began again the religious life of man; took up, as it were, to Himself the whole social order in its lowest and simplest elements and breathed into it unexpected spiritual long-

¹This discourse was preached by Monsignor Shahan, on Christmas night at High Mass in the Church of San Silvestro in Capite, Rome.

ings and energies, a new spiritual insight, new faith and hope, above all a new and irresistible love that was to be the solvent of the hardened hearts of mankind, the mighty force that was to lift to higher levels our broken and helpless race, semi-conscious indeed of its spiritual ruin, but too weak to raise itself, too blind to recognize in the vast labyrinth of idolatry and immorality the one true outlet of penance and conversion. This night, therefore, says one of the Fathers of the Church, all sorrow should be banished, for it is truly the birthday of human happiness. Filled with this glad knowledge, we confess that the tender infant in his cold manger is truly God Himself, who has taken up our helpless nature, save its sins and its sinful tendencies, has begun with the great enemy of mankind a supreme conflict in the very flesh that he hitherto dominated, and has made it certain for all time that not in matter, *i. e.*, not in the body with its passions nor the world with its attractions, not in an evil or indifferent God, not in a totally corrupt nature, nor in our incapacity to know and serve a higher power, lies the true source of all human misery, past or present, but in our own sinfulness, inherited and actual, in our own immemorial violation of the eternal law, in the growing volume of our iniquities that challenge and deserve the wrath of God, offended in His goodness and His justice, in His holiness, His power and His patience.

This night, dearly beloved brethren, was broken forever the power of sin, *i. e.*, the moral death which had overrun the earth and established its perverse order in all places. The gross naturalism of the Gentile world that ranged from the vile idolatry of the multitude to the fierce pessimism of a Tacitus and the refined atheism of a Lucretius, was this night vanquished. This night the glorious spiritual promises delivered to Israel, and emptied of their true life by a narrow Jewish nationalism, were given back to humankind, and religion enabled to begin its splendid career of universal beneficence that is far from ended, despite the ingratitude and injustice that it encounters too often at the hands of those to whom it has been most helpful.

Could we roll back the ages and stand before the Crib of Jesus and in its divine radiance look out upon the world He came to save, our hearts would be stricken with an anguish that no lips could express. We should only stand in mute amazement and confess how truly Christ could say later that He had convinced the world of sin and iniquity.

It is impossible to even outline the moral horrors of the world into which Jesus Christ was born. We know it only through pitiful fragments of its arts, its letters and its monuments, through faint echoes of the earliest Christian teaching and preaching, and through the ponderous learning of modern scholars. But the cruel pressure of universal sinfulness, without relief and without protest; the awful impact of popular philosophies of presumption or despair; the unrestrained course of social wrong that bore down woman, the child, the slave, the stranger, the poor, the conquered; the whole moral atmosphere oppressive beyond belief—all that is gone beyond our ken or memory, gone in the great tide of Christian triumph, religious, social, moral, that rose this night at Bethlehem and still rolls its glorious course through the world.

This night, indeed, the hour of divine mercy for mankind was at hand, and from the heavens poured forth the cry of God's revealing angels:—Glory to God in the highest and on earth peace to men of good will! That is, for the deadly worship of demons the clear knowledge and universal praise of the one true God and for the old order of mutual hatred a new law of love, infinite, universal, omnipotent. The angels may indeed be the joyful heralds of the good news, the glorious evangel of peace and love, but God Himself will be our Saviour, and the little infant now scarcely breathing will overthrow the ancient enemy of mankind so thoroughly that soon the Apostle of the Gentiles can taunt Him before the world and forever:—

O Death, where is thy victory?
O Grave, where is thy sting?

Yes, the arch-enemy of the one true God and of his pure and holy moral law, the exterminating Apollyon, king and angel of the bottomless pit (*Apoc.* ix, 2), was this night shorn of the ascendancy that for so many unhappy ages he exercised over the minds and hearts of mankind. Faith, hope and love came down from above, the heavens long besought rained down the Just Man, and the glorious visions of the prophets, cast against the forbidding background of Gentile corruption and Jewish perversity, were at last realized.

Bethlehem was, indeed, the birthplace of the new Gospel, and to nearby Jerusalem, the holy city, the city of the promises, the seat of divine revelation, the throne of David, the altar of the Most High, was it first offered, but in vain! A proud, obstinate, ungrateful, malicious people, His own race and kin, rejected the new-born Master of Heaven and Earth, the King of all the Ages, and He turned to another race, chose another kin and destined them to a spiritual authority that should one day immeasurably surpass their actual empire, splendid as it was, seated solidly around the great Middle Sea, majestic queen at whose feet the peoples and nations of the world cast daily their tribute of subjection and admiration. Legend, both ancient and eloquent, has it that here at Rome on the day of Christ's birth broke forth two wells of oil that ran unchecked to the Tiber, symbolic of the sweet and ever-spreading mercy of the new law of Christ that was to heal and purify forever bruised hearts, corrupted and corrupting lives, nay, all human society, and cause a new order and a new civilization, even the order and the civilization of the Catholic Church yet vigorous and promising despite the assaults of a thousand enemies and the machinations of the Evil One whose long mastery was this day checked at Bethlehem.

Another speaking legend, as lovely as it is ancient, makes the Emperor Augustus behold this night in a vision the Blessed Virgin with the Infant Jesus in her arms, standing in a resplendent sun, the Sun of Justice that would never again set, but would shine forever, and forever prevent the universal recurrence of the spiritual torpor of antiquity, its reign of

sinfulness and law of selfishness, its accepted order of injustice, the sum-total of all evil that had hitherto been the rule of human existence. Moral lapses and decay were inevitable, even in the Christian order, nor are its course and operations free from human imperfections. But it has within itself, as no other order of human life, before or since, a divine power of self-judgment, of self-restoration, of return to the higher and better things of the Gospel, of self-renewal in Christ Jesus, whose abundant healing graces are never lacking, but are everywhere and at all times ready in His Holy Church for those who turn meekly and penitently toward Bethlehem, *i. e.*, toward divine mercy now incarnate in the Infant of Bethlehem and finally triumphant on the altar of the Cross whose shadow, even now, far deeper than those of any Judaean night, falls athwart the manger where Mary and Joseph adore among the crowding angels and the symphonies of heaven.

While the divine Gloria is ringing in our ears and the heavens are alive with its infinite sublimities, let us too go over to Bethlehem with the shepherds, "and let us see this word that is come to pass, which the Lord hath showed us." (*Luke*, 11, 15.) Gazing on the sublime mysteries of the Incarnation and the birth of Jesus, let us try to fathom, as far as divine grace enables us, the depth and the strength of the love of Jesus that made Him quit His place at the eternal council-table of heaven, and in the ancient language of the Church empty Himself, as it were, for the love of man, take up our frail and suffering nature, take up also His abode with us amid the lowliest circumstances, and begin on earth His miraculous career from Bethlehem to Calvary. And as we gaze in loving admiration upon the Holy Family let us pray the Heavenly Father to renovate on that blessed model the hearts of men and to make it the foundation of that new social order whose solid pillars shall be justice and mercy, peace and love, an order that the Catholic Church established and in part made perfect, that has left indelible traces on human society, and must be again restored and perfected if we would understand fully, and understanding exhaust the vast capaci-

ties for good that God has laid up in our human nature, raised this blessed night to such a dizzy height of grandeur, united ineffably with the Second Person of the Blessed Trinity and in that union purified, sanctified, deified.

And while in our poor human way we try to fathom the incomparable honor so gratuitously paid this blessed night to His creature man by the Word of God, let us meditate deeply the words of St. Leo the Great in the noble Christmas sermon that nearly fifteen hundred years ago he addressed to the Christians of Rome on the very site where his successor, the tenth Pius, now gloriously reigns and preaches to all mankind the same saving doctrine, as though no unspeakable cataclysms of history separated the Vatican of the fifth from the Vatican of the twentieth century.

“Know thy dignity, O Christian man, and since thou shar’st henceforth the divine nature, let not a degenerate life lead thee back to thy former wretched estate. Call to mind of what head and of what body thou art a member, and forget not that thou hast been snatched from the power of darkness and brought into the light of God and into His kingdom.”

It is our great privilege, dearly beloved brethren, to celebrate this night the birth of Jesus in the city that He chose to be the seat of His religion, the living hearth from which should be forever borrowed the sacred fire of divine truth; in the very shadow of the glorious Crib that first sheltered our Emmanuel; in closest proximity to the venerable head of St. John the Baptist, the last of the prophets of Christ, among the first of His martyrs, and the first of His apostles; in one of the most ancient churches of Christendom that shows yet the scars of the long conflict of the Sun of Justice with the idolatrous worship of the orb of day, and in itself a continuous monument of the one true God over the legions of false gods, of the unbroken line of the papacy that was old when this church was first dedicated to God in honor of St. Sylvester and is yet young in the courage and vigor and endurance that come to it incessantly from the Holy Spirit. May the blessings of the holy time be yours in abundance, above all may your faith

be kindled here afresh in the divine character of the Infant of Bethlehem, in His mission of universal regeneration, in His power to solicit irresistibly the hearts of men, and in the future triumph of His Holy Church that still teaches here with no less charm and authority than when Peter and Paul laid down, in this city, their lives for the religion of Jesus Christ.

INTELLECTUALISM AND PRAGMATISM: THE PROBLEM OF KNOWLEDGE.*

II. THE INTELLECTUALISTIC THEORY.

The intellectualistic theory of knowledge—that is, the theory of moderate intellectualism as exemplified in Scholastic Realism—may be expressed in the following brief sentence: Knowledge consists originally in the mental apprehension of an object. Knowledge is a vital action indeed, but a complex and vital action of a special kind, both receptive and apprehensive in character, common to both object and subject. The direct and ultimate result is not one of production but one of apprehension by communication and union between object and subject. In the act of knowledge the object manifests itself as present to the subject on one side; and the subject, on the other, apprehends the object itself as present. Knowledge therefore, from the intellectualistic viewpoint, implies that “transcendence” which the empiric pragmatist dreads so much. It consists in the very leaping from the subject to the object, the “salto mortale” of the radical empiricist. It is the mental union of the subject with the object, which union results in the conscious and real apprehension of the object by the subject. When I say that *I perceive* this book on my desk, I do not express merely a feeling of various sensations which succeed each other or continue each other in my consciousness, but I express the very fact of the existence of a well determined object outside of my consciousness although in relation with it. In the same way, when I say that I have the *idea* or *concept* of man or of tree, I do not simply describe a subjective state of mind or express a mere name, but I intend primarily to mean an object, the object *man* or the object *tree* apprehended through its concept and expressed by a name.

* See *Catholic University Bulletin*, March, 1911.

Such is indeed the common sense notion of knowledge. It is also that of the Intellectualist who does not take alarm at being in accordance with common sense.

The intellectualistic notion of knowledge therefore is essentially transcendent, realistic and objective.

FACTS VERSUS THEORY: OBSERVATION VERSUS EXPLANATION.

Let us first lay down the elementary principles of method in the treatment of the problem. Here, as in every investigation, the question of method is of primary importance. Very often, it is because it has been ignored in the various scientific inquiries, especially in philosophy, that many pseudo-problems have been raised; that many mere difficulties have been converted into direct objections, when they should have preserved their true character of difficulties; that even evident facts have been denied or doubted, when their existence should have been sincerely accepted, even at the cost of a frank acknowledgment of ignorance on our part concerning their explanation. We may add that there is not perhaps one problem, in the whole field of philosophy, where this question of method has been more neglected, and where this neglect has caused more errors, than in the problem of knowledge.

The true method demands that we observe the facts before we begin to explain their existence or their nature. Again, explanation must be subordinated to observation, theory to facts, and the value of a theory must be judged by its respect for and accordance with the facts observed. Finally, inability to arrive at a satisfactory explanation of the existence or nature of a fact, must never become a pretext for denying the reality of its existence or the genuineness of its manifestation. To act otherwise is not to act according to reason but to give way to arbitrary caprice.

The application of these principles to the problem of knowledge suggests clearly the way and order to be followed in the study of that problem. At the same time, it brings out very

pointedly the initial and fundamental error of both the idealistic and pragmatic theories of knowledge. Both of them, Pragmatism as well as Idealism, are first and last *a priori* theories. Both deliberately sacrifice observation to explanation, facts to theory. It is evident that we have not to decide at first and by an *a priori* conception what the content of our knowledge *must be* in order to be true knowledge, as is being done by the Idealist; nor to investigate first *how* our knowledge takes place and to study the nature of its process of production to determine afterward the reality and nature of its object, as is being done by the Pragmatist. We must, from the start, observe knowledge as a fact, that is, as it manifests itself to our mind in its entirety and in its primary and spontaneous presentation, independently of any theory concerning the nature of its object or the conditions of its process: and this is precisely the position taken by Realistic Intellectualism.

THE DATA OF KNOWLEDGE AND EXPERIENCE.

Our first step therefore, in the study of this problem, is to observe knowledge as a fact, what we call the *data of experience*. Up to this point there is, theoretically at least, unanimous accord of all philosophers, of idealists like Bradley and pragmatists like Professor James and Dr. Schiller, of intuitionists like Bergson and of realists like Aristotle and S. Thomas. As soon as, however, it comes to the point of determining what we call the data of experience, the agreement ceases. Are the data of experience, from which we are bound to start, the data of "our" experience or the data of "pure experience"? If, on the one side, we answer that we must start with the data of "our" experience, are we not confronted with the danger of confusing what is really given with our interpretation of it, added to and mixed with it, by consequence of our individual education or of our inherited habits of race? Our experience in the adult age is not the same as in childhood. How then are we to distinguish what

is natural from what is acquired? On the other hand, if we answer that we must begin with the data of "pure experience," there arises the question: Where are we to find these data? Only newly born babes, Professor James tells us, or men under the influence of semi-comatic sleep, drugs, etc. . . . can be considered as having a pure experience in the literal sense of a feeling of a *that* which is not yet a *what*.¹ Such a description shows what the partisans of "pure experience" understand by the "purity" of experience. Does it not seem strange that, in order to study the fundamental and essential data of human knowledge, we should be bound to begin our investigation with the undeveloped, abnormal and morbid states of human life? Does it not seem strange that we could find, only there, the primary facts and elements of human knowledge? It appears evident that it is impossible to start with the so-called "pure experience." And even if it were possible or reasonable, it would remain, on the very principle of this theory, that we would not yet have reached the primary sources of experience, since even in the case of the newly born babe or the other particular cases mentioned, experience is already filled with the inherited habits acquired by the race.

Let us apply our principle: facts before theory. The data of "our" experience, whatever may be their origin or antecedents, whatever may be their degree of originality and purity or the number of acquired elements included among them, are the only experimental data which are really present to us and which may be object of observation for us. The so-called data of pure experience, on the contrary, far from being facts subject to direct observation, are elements hypothetical in their existence as well as in their nature. They are a theory not a fact; a theory the value of which can be judged only in function of and by inference from our actual and normal experience.

There is then no room for doubt or hesitation. If we wish to study human knowledge scientifically, the data of "our"

¹ "The Thing and Its Relations," in *A Pluralistic Universe*, app. A.

experience alone can furnish us with a positive starting point. Such is also Dr. Schiller's opinion, although we may, at times, notice some vague hesitation, on his part, concerning this question.² It is likewise the very method firmly maintained by Professor Bergson. Let us therefore study the fact of knowledge, as it presents itself to our observation in its present and normal state.

KNOWLEDGE AS SENSE PERCEPTION.

Our first act of knowledge is an act of perception or empirical intuition, an act of simple apprehension, as it is called by the Schoolmen. Now, what does this act of perception present to our mind and to our direct apprehension? Let us take an example. I am sitting at my desk, my eyes closed: I open my eyes and I perceive. What do I perceive? At the very first instant I perceive only a continuous, confused and heterogeneous whole. Desk, books, papers, etc. . . . form an indistinct continuity of objects, a mass of colors and forms occupying various places in space, where nothing is particularly remarked, determined or recognized. There is, no doubt, a confused perception of various objects, of similarities and differences between objects, which it is easy with the least attention to distinguish from or relate to each other. But, at this instant, variety, differences and similarities form an undivided and indistinct whole. There is not as yet any clear distinction between object and subject, substances and qualities; there is no clear perception of the relations between the objects perceived.³ One thing however is very clear: the presence of an object. In every act of perception, what I perceive directly and immediately is not the act itself of perception or sensation, but an object. When sitting at my desk I open my eyes, it is not the consciousness of seeing which manifests itself immediately to my mind, but the indistinct mass of objects present before my eyes; it is that mass of objects which

² *Studies on Humanism*, p. 184; see also p. 187.

³ St. Thomas, *Sum. Theol.*, I, p. 9, LXXXV, a. 3, 8.

I perceive. The consciousness of seeing exists indeed; but it occupies only the second place in my act of perception and is subordinated to the presence of the object. Such is the psychological fact, primary and irreducible, in my perception, as was well remarked by S. Thomas.⁴

This point cannot be too much emphasized, for it is of the highest consequence. The essentially "transcendental" and "objective" character of knowledge reveals itself as a fact. Hence the theory advanced concerning the process of the act of knowledge or the nature of the object perceived, whatever it may be, must take account of this fact and subordinate itself to it. Nobody can reasonably pretend to reject the element of "transcendence" under the pretext that it is mysterious or contradictory, any more than he can reasonably deny the existence of motion or of life under the pretext that he cannot explain it. This element manifests itself directly as an essential and integral element of our act of knowledge.

RADICAL AND IMMEDIATE EMPIRICISM EXAMINED

And so, at the very first step, we part company with Professor James' Radical Empiricism and Professor Dewey's Immediate Empiricism; and this we do in the name of experience itself. Moreover, if we examine Professor James' and Professor Dewey's theories, we may clearly see how their fear of transcendence leads them to a dead-lock and how transcendence imposes itself upon them in all its horror, if their theory is to be in any way at all a theory of knowledge.

According to Professor James, it is possible for our thought to have reference to things outside the field of our actual experience. He tells us that "the known may be a possible experience, either of that subject or another, to which the said conjunctive transitions would lead if sufficiently prolonged."⁵ According to Professor Dewey, an experience is

⁴ St. Thomas, *Sum. Theol.*, 9, LXXXV, a. 2.

⁵ "A World of Pure Experience," *Journal of Phil.*, vol. I, pp. 538 ff.

truly cognitional only on the condition of being "contemporaneously aware of meaning something beyond itself."⁶ Is not this transcendence pure and simple? Since the correspondence between my experience, as for instance the image of a fire and the event represented is admitted; since it is admitted that, under certain conditions, this correspondence might have been or may be actually experienced, is not the fact of transcendence granted as the very essential element of knowledge? Or if an odor is truly cognitional only on the condition that it means and tends to something beyond itself, a rose for instance, as maintained by Professor Dewey, does not this again necessarily imply the reality of transcendence? Does it not follow that our experimental knowledge does not consist in the mere subjective experiences or sensations which realize the "plan of action," but rather that it precedes, determines and directs them? that this "plan of action" is itself already a transcendental knowledge, since, whether I realize it or not, whether or not I follow the indications meant by that odor, it remains that it possesses the specific character of meaning and tending to something determined and beyond itself? The fulfilling experiences, had they taken place, might and would have then furnished an actual verification of my antecedent knowledge; they do not constitute it.

But Professor James would not accept these conclusions; transcendence must not be admitted. Our knowledge, he maintains, is "ambulatory" not "saltatory"; it does not consist in a transcendental relation of image to object, but in a continuous series of felt transitions. Let us recall his typical illustration.⁷ I am thinking of Memorial Hall. At the outset, Professor James says, nothing is in my mind but "a flat piece of substantive experience like any other, with no self-transcendence about it." "If I can lead you to the hall . . . ; if in its presence I now feel my idea to be continued; if the associates of the image and of the felt hall run parallel,

⁶ "The Experimental Theory of Knowledge," *Mind*, pp. 301 ff.

⁷ Cf. *The Catholic University Bulletin*, March 1911, p. 209.

so that each term of the one context corresponds serially, as I walk, with an answering term of the other . . . my idea must be called cognizant of reality. That percept was what it meant, for into it my idea has passed by conjunctive experiences of sameness and fulfilled intention. . . . Whenever such transitions are felt, the first experience knows the last one." I then know the Hall. My knowledge of it consists in the continuous succession of experiences unrolling themselves in time and corresponding serially to continuous feelings of satisfaction and fulfilled intention. My initial image then becomes a knower and the terminus an object meant or known.

In reality this description, which looks very much like an attempt to explain away transcendence, takes all the meaning it may have from the unconscious implication of that element, and it loses it all, as soon as this element is truly put aside. For, how could this initial image be a term of "experiences of conjunction," unless it contains already in itself an element of adaptation to the other term, a term outside itself, of the said conjunction? And if it means something beyond itself, it is self-transcendent, it is already an act of knowledge. I cannot help thinking that Professor James, unconsciously, evades this conclusion by a mere verbal delusion. There is, he will say, between my image and the Hall, a *continuity*, a *felt-transition*. I maintain that the simplest observation manifests the consciousness of a *correspondence* and of an *objective and transcendental relation* between the image and the Hall. Again, why is it that in presence of the Hall, the image is accompanied by the consciousness of satisfaction and fulfilled intention, if not because it contained already a certain relation with the said Hall, because it was already a representation, in memory or by anticipation, of Memorial Hall, now clearly recognized and clearly verified by its actual correspondence with the Hall presently perceived? If, from the beginning, it was not already a determined knowledge, although perhaps vague, but merely a "flat piece of substantive experience like any other, with no self-transcendence about it," how was it in any way the image of Memorial

Hall rather than the image of any other object? Where is the foundation of the so-called continuity between the initial image and the subsequent experience? and where is the source of that consciousness of *fulfilled intention* I have in presence of the Hall? This final consciousness of fulfillment, if it means anything at all, means at least that there was in my image something that could be fulfilled and has been as a matter of fact satisfactorily fulfilled by the actual perception of the hall; that is, that there was a correspondence, a relation between the representation contained in the image and the object actually perceived—a correspondence now actually apprehended.

Moreover, we might ask, without being open to the reproach of overcritical curiosity where knowledge truly comes in? It is not at the starting point, for the image is not yet a knower. It is not at the end, for there is then no knower, since the initial image has disappeared. It is not in the intermediary experiences, since there is not yet a knower, nor is there yet any fulfillment.⁸ Would Professor James say that the initial image, although not representative of anything, had at this point however a meaning and an intention, meaning and intention now consciously apprehended? He should then confess that the initial image was more than a "flat piece of substantive experience;" that it contained a meaning and intention of *something determined beyond itself*. And what is this but an admission of the transcendental character of that image?

Thus, according to Pragmatic Empiricism, there is, in our act of knowledge, no transcendental leap from subject to object, —although objective reality, we are told, exists independently of our ideas, and we know with what indignation Professor James protests against the accusation of subjectivism,—but merely a process of continuous transition between images and "the most authentic substitutes and representatives" of objective reality.⁹ Hence, the entire act of knowledge unrolls

⁸ See James B. Pratt, "What is Pragmatism," pp. 160 ff., (New York, 1909), where this point is well developed.

⁹ *Journ. of Philos.*, vol. iv, p. 398.

itself wholly between the limits of individual experience of the subject, by a transition from image to image, until we happen to experience that element of the process which is the "most authentic substitute and representative" of external or objective reality. Truly, one who reads these words begins to hesitate, and seriously to suspect that he has misunderstood the theory, when he reflects that it is supposed to do away with transcendence. For does not all this explanation clearly imply and postulate the existence and reality of transcendence? The images are substitutes and representatives. Substitutes and representatives of what? And if they are substitutes and representatives of external reality, how are they so, but by a relation of transcendence of the representative to the object of which it is the representative? We are told that knowledge exists when we experience the *most authentic* representatives of reality. Would we be deemed too exacting, if we were to ask for the marks of this authenticity? And would it be too rash to assert that they cannot be anything else than the transcendental relation, consciously and objectively apprehended, between the representative and the object represented.

But transcendence must not be admitted, under any consideration. Knowledge, it is asserted by the Empiricist, ultimately resolves itself into the adaptation of my successive impressions to their satisfaction. What then shall we say of the case when I am fully satisfied with a certain opinion, although I am in reality mistaken. Suppose, for instance, that I am fully satisfied with the idea that some sentence has been pronounced by such a man, while it has been in fact pronounced by another. And let us suppose moreover that one of my friends, without my knowing it, is as fully satisfied with the idea that it has been pronounced by another, that is, the right person. Will the Pragmatist say that in my case there is *no* knowledge? or that it is a case of *false* knowledge? I am yet as fully satisfied as my friend whose knowledge is true. It remains therefore that mere subjective satisfaction cannot constitute or authenticate knowledge; that genuine knowledge must necessarily include an objective reference, as well as the

consciousness of it, to a reality beyond subjective experience, objective reference which is the true criterion between true and false knowledge.

Truly, when one speaks of knowledge, transcendence is implied; it is the very essence of knowledge; knowledge and transcendence stand or fall together. Without that element, in spite of all protestations to the contrary, nothing remains but a vague and subjective impressionism.

KNOWLEDGE AND THE DATA OF INTELLECTUAL APPREHENSION.

Not only have we immediate perceptions through sense experience, but we have also immediate apprehensions of an intellectual order. In our first act of knowledge, the object does not only present itself to our senses as a confused mass of colors, an indistinct and continuous extension, etc. . . ., but it is, moreover, immediately apprehended by our intelligence as a "something" concretely realized and subsisting in these divers qualities perceived by our senses. This intellectual apprehension or abstractive intuition of "being," as immediately given, is as spontaneous and natural in its order, as the very perception of color, sound or extension in sense-perception. It is confused at first, yet very rich and pregnant with reality. It presents to our mind a content which our intelligence, with its ability and desire to understand, cannot fail to explore. And thus, by applying its power of abstraction, penetration and reflection to the data of sense experience apprehended in connection with the fundamental element of "being," and concentrating it successively upon their various aspects, our intelligence discovers the divers characters, determinations and relations of this element of being, of which the concrete reality present to us is the actual and individual realization. We discover the elements of existence, of potency and act, of substance and qualities, of unity and multiplicity, of distinction and continuity, etc. . . . which are as many determinations of that "something," so vaguely perceived at first. These various

elements form the content of our primitive concepts or ideas. We discover also their fundamental conditions of existence and necessary relations which form the matter of our primitive judgments or principles, such as the principles of identity and contradiction. By reflecting upon its own act of apprehension in relation to the thing apprehended, our intelligence perceives the distinction as well as the relation between being as known and being as knowing, that is, between object and subject. And so, by successive acts of abstraction, comparison and reflection, our mind apprehends the elements and relations which constitute the very essence of reality, independently of, although actually realized in, concrete and individual circumstances and conditions.¹⁰

If we now examine, without any *a priori* theory concerning its nature or its process of formation, the fact of intellectual apprehension or conception, as it presents itself immediately to our mind, we may observe in it the following data.

My first act of intellectual knowledge is not an act of explicit judgment, but an act of immediate apprehension of something existing, in which unity and multiplicity, permanence and change, etc. . . . are, as yet, confusedly mixed together.

As, through empirical intuition, the individual and concrete object presents itself naturally and spontaneously to my senses as "transcendent," so the elements apprehended through my concepts present themselves to my intelligence as objective and real. My intelligence does not produce or shape them according to some arbitrary or artificial device; it discovers them in and expresses them out of the individual determinations in which they are implicated. In the building up and formation of its concepts, it does not accept any element or relation which has not its foundation in the actual data of experience; and, under the constant guidance and control of these data, it attempts to apprehend as exactly as possible, in its essential

¹⁰ St. Thomas, *Contra Gentes*, l. II, c. 83; 99 *disp.*, *de Veritate*, q. 1; *Summa Theologica*, I, p. 9, XII, a. 4; 9, LXXXV, a. 5 etc. . . ; Cajetan, *Comment. de Ente et Essentia*, subinitio; see our article in the *Catholic University Bulletin*, March 1910, pp. 215-217.

elements and fundamental relations, that very reality which our senses, through their empirical intuitions, perceive in its outside surface.

Again, there is a clear distinction between a concept and an image or a word. While an image is the mere representation, more or less confused, of a concrete and particular object, a concept implies essentially a meaning, that is, contains the *raison d'être* of the object apprehended or conceived. As to the word, far from constituting the concept, it is merely its expression, expression which is modified and determined according to the very modifications and determinations of the concept itself. Such is the law of formation in every language.¹¹

Finally, it is true, in a certain sense and measure, that a concept may be influenced in its formation, by needs, interests, emotions, etc. . . ., that it may be purposive. But this influence does not affect the *matter of the content* of the concept. Needs, interests, emotions, etc. . . . may stimulate the intelligence to form a concept, determine its direction or its degree of precision; but the matter itself of the content whatever its character or degree of precision may be, is always determined by the object.¹²

THE PRAGMATIST NOTION OF CONCEPT EXAMINED.

As we have already said¹³ Pragmatism denies that our concepts are truly representative and apprehensive of reality. And the Pragmatist takes delight in emphasizing what he considers an irreducible opposition between concept and reality. Reality, he says, is essentially concrete and individual, while our concepts are by nature abstract and general. Reality is dynamic and evolutive, while our concepts are static and immutable. Reality is continuous and synthetic, while our concepts

¹¹ Cf. Whitney, *Life and Growth of Language*.

¹² Cf. *The Catholic University Bulletin*, November 1909, pp. 609 ff.

¹³ Cf. *The Catholic University Bulletin*, March 1911, pp. 206-207.

are fragmentary and analytic. How then could our concepts be representations of reality?

Yet the Pragmatist admits the utility and necessity of concepts in human knowledge. They cannot indeed represent reality, but, he insists, they are useful and necessary instruments, imposed upon our mind by the conditions of human life, by which we prepare ourselves to enter into contact with reality and to keep in touch with it. They are efficacious means by which we are enabled to handle and communicate it.

Hence the Pragmatist conclusion that our concepts are "practical substitutes for pure experience" or "words with a steering function" in our attempt to express reality;—"plans of action" devised to direct our knowledge;—"tools" invented and fashioned by the human mind for a successful mastery of experience;—"dynamic schemas" or a kind of intellectual scaffolding built by man in order to allow him to experience and live reality. In a word, in the Pragmatic system, concepts are not representations produced in our mind by reality and corresponding to it; they are mere artificial means and instruments devised and built by our mind to use and master reality.

Let us say at once that we have no intention of denying the great importance and value of experience or intuition, nor do we feel any hesitation in confessing the essential inadequacy of the concept in human knowledge. We find in nature, as actually realized, only concrete and individual beings: man or tree, as such, does not exist in reality, but only such and such an individual man or such and such a tree with its peculiar determinations. And the very first operation by which we apprehend these concrete beings is an act of sense-perception or experimental intuition.¹⁴ Again, intuition alone is able to apprehend reality in its original and individual determinations, with all the riches of its details, in that particular space and in that unique and never-to-be-repeated moment of time in which it exists and which constitute its original individuality.

¹⁴ St. Thomas, *Sum. Theol.*, I, p., q. XII, a. 12; q. LXXXIV, a. 3; q. LXXXV, a. 1, 2 ad 2; *De Verit.*, q. x, a. 6; *De Spirit. Creat.*, a. 4; *De Ente et Essentia*, c. 4, etc. . . .

Finally, a real being, concrete and individual as given in nature, is essentially a synthetic union of elements which are organically and integrally connected with and adapted to each other, and intuition alone is able to apprehend it in this organic unity.

On the other hand, our concepts are essentially abstract. They exist only by deliberately neglecting, in the individual reality, certain elements or aspects of elements, namely, those very elements or aspects which constitute its concreteness and individuality. Again, they proceed through analysis; they consider separately the essential elements of reality, and destroy the very synthetic unity which constitutes the organic wholeness and the peculiar originality of every concrete being. Hence our concepts, whatever may be their number or degree of precision, remain always inadequate in their representation of any individual reality. There is always more in reality than in any of our concepts.

In all this there is nothing that is not accepted by the best Intellectualists. St. Thomas states that a true and complete knowledge is one which apprehends an object in its concrete individuality: that our knowledge of things, through abstract concepts, always remains incomplete and imperfect.¹⁵ He emphasizes the distinction between *intellectus* which apprehends its object by a direct insight or intellectual intuition, and *ratio* which proceeds by analysis and discourse, that is, by concepts, judgments and reasoning.¹⁶ Intellectual knowledge is perfect in the measure in which it is the fruit of *intellectus*. In God intelligence is pure and perfect *intellectus*; He knows all things in their most concrete determinations and in all their comprehensiveness by one simple act of intuition. Even in the angels there is no *ratio*, although their intellectual intuition, being finite, is always inadequate.¹⁷ Man, whose nature is

¹⁵ *Sum. Theol.*, I. p. q. LV, a. 3 ad 2; LXXXIV, 7; *Opera*, 14, c. 14; *Quodlib.* 7 a. 3 ad 1, etc. . . .

¹⁶ 2a 2d q. XLIX, a. 5 ad 3; LXXXIII, a. 10 ad 2; *De Verit.*, 15, 1; *In Trinit.*, 6, 1, etc. . . .

¹⁷ *Id.*, XXV, q. I, a. 1 ad 4; *Sum. Theol.*, I. p. q. XIV, a. 11; I c. *Gentes*, 65; II c. *Gent.*, 100, etc. . . .

made of spirit and matter and whose operations, in the present life, are dependent upon the conditions of matter, of space and time, must necessarily know through concepts and discourse. *Ratio* is his natural faculty of knowledge. And although to be *rational* is relatively to human nature a perfection, it is however, from the point of view of knowledge, an essential imperfection which has its source in the very essence of man.¹⁸ Thus, our human concepts, although true as representations, remain always inadequate to concrete reality. They can never comprehend it in its entirety and originality. Concrete and individual reality remains always indefinable: "*Omne individuum ineffabile.*"¹⁹

But when this has been said, all has not been said. The necessity and advantages of intuition in human knowledge have been emphasized, not its insufficiency and shortcomings. The insufficiency and shortcomings of the concept have been pointed out, not its necessity and value. And while the Pragmatist, without further hearing, pronounces the concept unable to provide us with true knowledge, the Intellectualist more equitable, wants to inquire more deeply into the meaning, function and value of the concept and demands in its favor a fair trial.

Let us first examine the Pragmatic attitude toward the notion of concept. As we have said, Pragmatism, although denying any value of representation to the concept, maintains nevertheless that it is useful for knowledge. It is, at least, a "practical substitute," a "word with a steering function," a "plan of action," a "dynamic schema" by which we are directed toward, and are enabled to enter into, contact with reality; it is also a useful instrument for the communication of knowledge.

But we may well ask how the concept can fulfill these functions, how it can be a "plan of action" or a "dynamic schema," a "word with a steering function," unless it is first

¹⁸ In 2 d. 3, q. 1, a. 2, 6; 1, p. q. LVIII, a. 3-4; 2a 2d q. XLIX, a. 5 ad 2, 3; 1 c. *Gent.*, 57, etc. . . .

¹⁹ 1 p. q. XIV, a. 11; 1, c. *Gent.*, 65, 8; *De Verit.*, II, 5; *De Anima.* 2, 5, 20, etc. . . .

known and unless it is itself a representation of something. In order to fulfill the part assigned to it, it must already be present to, assimilated and apprehended by, our mind as meaning and directing toward the reality of which it is the plan or schema. Nay more, it must already be a first step in the very act of knowledge and apprehension of reality.

And not only must this plan or schema be the representation of something, but it must also be clear and definite as a representation. For the Pragmatist assuredly will not maintain that all our concepts have the same value as instruments of direction in every case of knowledge. He will make a discrimination between the useful and the useless concepts in each particular case. He will even retain one as being the most useful in each case. What will then be the criterion of usefulness or uselessness which will serve to distinguish between these concepts? It is not sufficient to say that our concepts are dynamic and directive. A dynamism and a direction have no meaning but by the definite end to which they tend. Their degree of usefulness is measured by their relation to that end and by the representation in our mind of that relation. In a word, our concepts cannot fulfill that function of plan or schema assigned them by the Pragmatist, unless they are known themselves, known as related to, and representing somehow, that very object of which they are the plan or schema. Hence, if our concepts are to be useful instruments, as the Pragmatist understands it, they must first be true representations, and they will be useful as instruments in the very measure in which they will be true representations and known as such.

The same remark must be applied to what the Pragmatist says of concept as a means of communication. If a concept is useful as a means of communication, it necessarily implies a well-defined meaning, assimilable first by the one who communicates it, and then by the one to whom it is being communicated; that is, a meaning not ultimately dependent upon individual experience, but determined by an objective and impersonal standard, which cannot be but the relation of the concept to reality. And if we are told that the process of communi-

cation does not consist in the participation in a common representation, but in the taking up of a common attitude, the answer is obvious. An attitude, if it has any meaning or usefulness at all, cannot be but the expression of a knowledge either already possessed or at least anticipated; in any case, it supposes a certain representation.

Moreover, the final intuition or pure experience, which is considered by the empiricist Pragmatist as the true act of knowledge, is but the ultimate result of that discursive work where concepts have been used as instruments and directive principles; it is but the fulfillment of the plan, the filling up of the schema. The intuition or experience attained will therefore be proportional to the concepts used. It cannot be said that the concept has been used merely as an external frame or a mental scaffolding which must disappear when experience takes place; for, in reality, the concept has acted all along as an internal, vital and organizing principle, as the soul, as it were, of the act now performed. If, then, intuition or experience is asserted to be a real apprehension of things in their true and objective reality, it must be acknowledged that our concepts already contained and represented it in some way. If it is maintained that our concepts have no correspondence with reality or are merely an artificial construction, or in any measure a deformation of it, then this lack of correspondence, this artificiality or deformation must of necessity find its expression in the final intuition or experience.

The Pragmatist may verbally deny the representative value of the concept; in reality he has to have recourse to it at every step and so he does. He may speak explicitly of practical attitudes and schemas of action; he implicitly postulates some representative idea which determines and directs them. How could it be otherwise? How could any practical attitude be reasonable, or any schema of action be truly directive, unless it would be known as having a certain correspondence with, or adaptation to, the term which it is intended to reach? Professor Le Roy, for instance, tells us that "a dogma enunciates above all a *prescription of a practical order*;" that "it is above all

the formula of a *rule of practical conduct*;" that, "in this consists its chief value, its positive meaning." Yet he adds that a dogma "asserts implicitly that reality contains (under some form or other) that which is necessary to justify, as reasonable and salutary, the prescribed conduct."²⁰ Now, if this is the case, does it not mean that every dogma, in order to be and before it may be a rule of reasonable action, must be first apprehended intellectually as a judgment which affirms the existence and nature of a certain reality? Does it not mean that every dogma is constituted primarily of concepts known as corresponding somehow to a reality, since this very correspondence with reality is the source and rule of the reasonableness of our subsequent action? By way of illustration, Professor Le Roy tells us that the dogma "God is personal" means "Behave in your relations to God as in your relations to a human person."²¹ But does not this necessarily and antecedently imply, since our attitude is reasonable and salutary, that we know with certitude that there is in God an element which is to Him what personality is to man? That we have a certain concept—analogical indeed, yet exact and true—of God as a person?

Truly, "pure experience" or "pure intuition" as well as "pure action" is a mere fancy. Concept is a necessary element of every act of knowledge as well as of every action, which pretends to be reasonable, not only as an instrument of direction, but primarily as an object of knowledge. It is only through concepts that our mind can fully apprehend and penetrate into the data of experience.²²

²⁰ *Dogme et Critique*, p. 25.

²¹ *Dogme et Critique*, p. 25; pp. 135 ff.

²² This point is well developed in the fine pamphlet of J. de Tonquédec: "La Notion de vérité dans la Philosophie Nouvelle," pp. 106 ff. Would space allow us, it would be easy to show that the fundamental error of Pragmatic Empiricism, in regard to the notion and value of the concept, has its source in the arbitrary assumptions of Idealism and also in a false notion of Genetic Psychology. On this latter point, see Walker, "Theories of Knowledge," (London, 1910), ch. vii.

THE INTELLECTUALISTIC NOTION OF THE CONCEPT.
CONCEPT AND INTUITION.

It is a fact that we have concepts in our mind: I have the concepts of man, of animal, of tree, of stone, etc. . . . These concepts are more than mere words or sounds, for they certainly mean something to my mind. They are also more than mere images deadened or blunted in the course of time, although they may be accompanied by images. While an image is always the representation of some individual object with its peculiar determinations, a concept signifies a whole class. While a deadened or blunted image is but a confused and fluctuating representation of some concrete object, a concept remains always clear and fixed. Moreover, there are objects of which I cannot obtain an image, while I can conceive and define them; this is the case for most of our mathematical notions. These essential differences between image and concept have been well pointed out by H. Taine.²³

But a concept is also more than the mere combination of an image with a name, as is maintained by Taine, and more recently, by Professor Bergson. According to Taine, a concept is but an "abstract name" which is the sign of or substitute for divers images representing individual objects of the same class, thanks to some element common to all of them. Suppose, for instance, Taine says, a child who sees different types of dogs. The word "dog" will remain associated in his mind with a certain number of individual objects of the same class. When pronounced, it will awake in his mind some image representing one or several members of that class only, and the image of any dog will evoke in his mind the word "dog" only. Hence this term will come to evoke indifferently the image of any dog and it will also be evoked by the image of any dog. It will then become the sign or substitute for a certain element common to

²³ *De L'Intelligence*, tom. I, p. 36 ff.; tom. II, p. 259 ff. Cf. also T. V. Moore: *The Process of Abstraction*, (Berkeley, 1910).

all these individual objects. It will become a general or "abstract name," and this is a concept.²⁴ Similarly, a concept, for Professor Bergson, is merely "an average image" (*une image moyenne*) made of a certain number of objects of the same class, which we come to consider as the essence of that object.²⁵

Here we may call attention again to the same fundamental defect of method which has been already pointed out in the question of perception. Instead of first observing the concept as it presents itself to our mind, Taine and Professor Bergson, probably under the influence of *a priori* empiricism, attempt to build up a theory of the origin and nature of the concept which will show that our concepts *must be* mere empirical constructions, and *how they are* so. Theory is given precedence over facts; observation is subordinated to explanation.

Such a theory, however, appears decidedly insufficient as a description of the concept. As long as we remain in the field of experience, the sign or substitute in Taine's theory, as well as Professor Bergson's "average image," is necessarily restricted to the particular cases observed. Its application and generality are limited to those cases; for, by what right should it be extended to others? But a concept, on the contrary, as that of man, of circle or of triangle has an unlimited universality. It transcends the cases observed and applies to all cases, whether observed or not, even to merely possible cases, of the same class, to all men, to all circles or triangles. If so, the empiricist theory is plainly inadequate in its account of the origin of our concepts as well as in the description of their nature. We are told that a name is associated as a sign with the elements common to the various individual objects of the same class. How is this association possible? A name is conventional by nature. Its meaning is determined by the conscious state or the object with which it is associated. It supposes therefore this conscious state or this object as already given and known. A common or abstract name then implies necessarily the antecedent appre-

²⁴ *Op. cit.*, tom. II, p. 261 ff.

²⁵ *L'Evolution Créatrice*, p. 327.

hension of a common or abstract notion from which it takes its meaning. Now, a common or abstract notion does not exist as such in reality; but it has to be formed by the mind from the data of reality, and only then can a name be attached to it as a sign and become its verbal substitute. An "abstract name" therefore supposes an abstract thought or concept and does not constitute it. When a child comes to apply the word "dog" to all the animals of a certain class, it is because he has first conceived in them some element common to all. He has made an act of abstraction and conceived, under the various and particular determinations of the different dogs, some essential element characteristic of the class "dog;" it is that essential and common element which he expresses by a common name.

We must first abstract in order to speak, and our progress in speaking is measured by our progress in giving more precision to our abstract concepts. To abstract and to conceive is as natural and spontaneous an act for our human intelligence as to see is for the eye or to hear for the ear; for we naturally want to understand what we perceive. In presence of the experimental data of our senses, our intelligence naturally conceives an essence or *raison d'être*, which gives to each object its specific structure and must necessarily be, where any such object possibly is, independently of any peculiar determinations. This essence is represented through a concept with its characters of necessity and universality. A name is then attached to it, in order to fix and express it. The concept takes its rise in sense-images; but it is neither an image nor a combination of images. It contains the element of intelligibility common to the objects represented by images, the constitutive elements which make them the kind of objects they are. And as by the progressive experience and education of our senses we come to a clearer and more distinct perception of the individual character of concrete objects, so by a more mature reflection, our intelligence obtains a more precise and a more comprehensive concept of the essential elements, which constitute the specific nature of these objects. The study of the intellectual development in the child, as well as the psychological study of the development of the

various languages, furnishes us with an experimental manifestation and proof of this fact.

Through our senses, then, we acquire the representations of various objects, and through our intelligence, we conceive the objects represented. And while our senses, in their experimental intuitions, present to us a multitude of various and individual objects, as, for instance, *several men*, each one with its own peculiar changing and dynamic determinations, our intelligence represents these many, various and individual objects in one same, general and static concept, as that of *man*. How is it possible that the reality contained in one and the same concept of our intelligence may correspond and be identical with the reality contained in the many various images of our sense images? How can this single abstract reality in the concept be multiplied in, and identified with, every one of the many individual realities of our images, and yet remain one?

This is the old, and yet ever new, problem of the *one* and the *many*. This problem has been the central question of Greek philosophy and has given rise to its two chief primitive systems and schools, the Eleatic and the Ionic schools, where successively the affirmation of the *many* and of the *Becoming* has ended the negation of the *one* and of *Being*, and the affirmation of the *one* and of *Being* has ended in the negation of the *many* and the *Becoming*. In the Middle Ages this problem was known and discussed as the *Problem of the Universals* and diversely solved by the Realists and the Nominalists. And it is this same problem, with the same opposite solutions, that we find in the present systems of Monism or Absolutism and of Pluralism—a problem which has been Professor James' torment for years, he tells us, has caused him to fill hundreds of sheets of paper with notes and memoranda and finally has led him to abandon the intellectualistic logic to take refuge with Professor Bergson in the Empiricism of pure experience, as it had led Bradley to the Idealism of the Absolute.

In order to reach the true solution, we must come back to the conclusions of Aristotle refuting both Parmenides and Heraclitus, of St. Thomas opposing both Platonic Realism and

Empirical Nominalism, to the conclusions of the traditional and moderate Intellectualism which acknowledges both the many and the one, Being and Becoming in reality, and gives a legitimate place to both intuition and concept in human knowledge.

Experimental intuition is the starting point and the groundwork of all human knowledge—this we readily admit. It is also true that experimental intuition presents reality to us in the concrete and individual conditions of its actual existence, while the concept leaves aside these very concrete elements in which and through which reality actually exists. But if, in its act of conception, our intelligence provisorily neglects some elements of reality, it also discovers and apprehends something which intuition implicitly contains and does not perceive. In nature, only concrete and particular beings have an actual existence. There are, for instance, concrete and individual men; man, as such, does not actually exist. There are in nature, however, elements of similarity between the various concrete beings. There are types and laws. All the concrete and individual men existing are as many realizations of one type or essence, as Aristotle calls it, which essence has a real foundation in nature, although it is actually realized only in concrete and particular beings. And this is the object of the concept. In presence of the various experimental data perceived by the senses, our intelligence, which is as much of a natural knowing power in man as the senses themselves, conceives through them and in them the fundamental *raison d'être* of what they are, which determines and regulates their specific nature independently of any concrete condition. Thus, through its action of conception, intelligence does not only neglect the individual elements—for this is only a preparatory step—but it penetrates more deeply into the nature of the object presented. It removes the envelope in order to read the contents; and by repeating this operation on the various data, it discovers a distinct unity and totality where our senses could perceive only a confused mass.²⁶

²⁶ St. Thomas, *opusc.* 14 c. 14.

Moreover, there are relations and connections between the various beings in nature. Whether we speak of a plan in a state of, or on the way to, realization, or whether we postulate, with the partisans of Empiricism, a continuous direction, a dynamic orientation and evolution, or a creative *élan vital* in nature,—it does not matter in the present inquiry,—the fact is that the world is not in a chaotic state. It contains, whatever the extent of their influence or the law of their action may be, causes and ends, relations and adaptations, order and harmony. It contains or realizes some idea. Now, a direction or an evolution, a plan or an impulse has no meaning unless it is determined; and it cannot be determined, but by a definite end, whatever this end may be, which characterizes its specific nature and regulates its action. In order to apprehend this plan or evolution in its structure or in its continuity, we must of necessity apprehend, not only the concrete and individual elements themselves, but also their mutual relations in the present as well as their relations with the past and with the future. Our intuition perceives at every moment only the concrete phenomena actually given; the concept alone can apprehend their mutual relations of similarity and of interaction, as well as their law of specific continuity.

Thus, a concept is not a deformation of reality, an artificial construction of our mind or a mere instrument of possible action. It is above all a means of knowledge, an apprehension and representation of some elements of reality. It is not a hypothetical schema built up by our intelligence in order to master reality, but the representation of some element, furnished by reality, and apprehended by our intelligence.

All this implies indeed—we confess it without any evasion or fear, even after Kant and the Kantian storm—a correspondence between reality and our mind. But why should we doubt at all the reality of such a natural correspondence? If knowledge exists in any degree,—and it exists as a matter of fact,—it has no meaning except through such an implication. It exacts necessarily that this correspondence exist, or rather it is the very manifestation and expression of the fact of this

correspondence. To begin by doubting it is to render it impossible for oneself to make a single step in the field of mental activity; it is to deny the very fact of knowledge. As soon as one begins to doubt the existence of a fundamental agreement between reality and his mind, any mental advance becomes absolutely impossible, and scepticism is logically the last, as well as the first, word of everything. It would be easy to show that Kant himself, throughout his whole system, although theoretically starting with a doubt as to the relations between reality and mind, postulates at every step their correspondence.

It is true that our concepts being abstract by nature are fragmentary and inadequate. It does not follow, however, that they are false. Each of them represents reality only under a special aspect, yet it represents it in some of its fundamental and real elements. While our senses perceive only external and changing phenomena, our intelligence conceives essential and stable elements. There is no opposition between the perceptions and data of our senses on the one hand, and the conceptions and concepts of our intelligence on the other; nor is there separation between the former and the latter; there is only distinction; nay more, there is always a close union of the two. It is the same reality which is in different ways apprehended by both. The process of abstraction—we can never insist too much on this point—is not primarily a process of exclusion of, but above all a process of penetration into, the data of sense experience. Operations of the same agent and centered upon the same object, sense-perception and intellectual conception accompany and enlighten each other in their development. It is through their union and coöperation that we are able to arrive, as far as is possible for human intelligence, at a complete and intelligible knowledge of reality. The senses in their data furnish the intelligence with the matter of its concepts; and the intelligence, with the concepts thus acquired, reverts to the data of the senses for a deeper and more accurate knowledge of them.²⁷

²⁷ Cf. St. Thomas, 4. d. q. 1, a. 3; *De Anima*, 20 ad 1, etc. . . .

But the great objection, raised against the intellectualistic notion of the concept by the Empiricist, is that it is essentially *static*, *definitely closed*, while reality is *dynamic* and *continuous flowing*. This description of the respective characteristics of the concept and of reality may indeed seem to imply an irreducible opposition between them. But this description, in its apparently concise brevity, is false. There is indeed dynamism and change in nature; but nature contains also elements of stability and permanence. A tree grows and yet, at the divers moments of its existence and stages of its development, it remains the same tree. A man passes, in constant progress, from childhood to adolescence, then to manhood and to old age; yet, throughout these successive transformations, he has remained substantially the same man. A tree reproduces a tree of the same kind; a man gives birth to other men. Under all these transformations and developments, there is always a principle of similarity and permanence. Even in pure duration, which is considered by Professor Bergson as the very substance of reality and which he describes as a continuous flowing, there is some fixed, permanent and static element. In order that duration or continuity may exist, there must be fixation of the past and anticipation of the future in the present. This is impossible, unless there exists a certain element of permanence which endures identical to itself in these various moments. Otherwise there would be nothing but present changes and new beginnings at each moment, without any duration or continuity. It is this static and permanent element of reality which the concept apprehends and represents.

Why then should the Empiricists oppose concept to reality? They describe the concept "as a static view taken on the instability of things,"²⁸ as a "crystallized," an "inert" and "dead" thing, as a "fleshless abstraction," or a "bloodless notion"; the concept of motion is presented as an artificial construction of mobility made by the addition of static positions,

²⁸ Bergson, *L'Evolution Créatrice*, p. 340.

etc. . . . We might remark incidentally that images and combinations of images play too great a part in these descriptions and too often take the place of proofs;—they may appeal to the imagination, but they cannot and should not satisfy the mind. When we maintain that the concept is static, we simply mean that it represents the static or permanent element of reality, that is, the very essence which constitutes the specific and permanent nature of an object. Every object, whether it be movable or immovable, has an essence which constitutes it in its mobility or immobility, and this essence is always identical to itself. It is the very nature of motion, for instance, to move; it is a passage from potency to act; and it is always necessarily so, whatever may be its particular determinations of velocity, space or time. It is this element, truly static, since it is constitutive of motion at every stage of its course and in every condition of its existence, which the concept represents. The concept therefore does not stop motion in order to contemplate it; it apprehends it in its mobility, in its essence as a movable thing, which is always and everywhere the same.

It is equally inaccurate to describe the concept as a “rigid,” “inert,” “definitely closed” and “dead” schema; as a “bloodless” or “fleshless” notion. As intuition itself, the concept is a vital act of the mind. Far from being inert or definitely closed, it is subject to a continuous development in substantial identity. It traces at first an outline with vague and flexible lines, ready to be filled in and determined by all the results of experience and science. It is like a germ ready to open and grow under the influence and by a vital assimilation of the new data of experimental and scientific investigation, without however losing anything of its fundamental identity. Our concept of animal, for instance, is first made up of a vague notion sufficient to discern its object from any other object. This notion becomes then more and more determined although identical in its essential elements, more and more distinct, by a kind of intellectual intussusception and assimilation of all the knowledge acquired through the various sciences, physical,

biological, psychological, etc. . . . which have for their object the study of animal life.²⁹

What we have just said of our concepts may be applied equally to our judgments. Our judgments are not a mere combination of concepts applied to reality, a mere addition of concepts united by the copula "is," and simply useful to classify various objects and relations. They are, above all, expressions of reality; expressions, which we make as exact as possible, although they may always remain inadequate, of the synthetic unity of the elements of reality. We have indeed to use the process of analysis in order to obtain distinct concepts; but we find in reality the foundation of their distinction. Our judgments are made of these distinct concepts and they are expressed in distinct words, but we are well aware that they mean more than a simple addition of those concepts. These concepts, in our judgments, through a mutual integration and adaptation and yet without losing their proper signification, form together a synthetic and organic whole tending to reproduce the synthetic unity of the many elements of reality. When I say that man is a rational animal, I do not mean simply that man is animal *plus* rational, but that he is a being in whom the properties of animality and rationality are united and adapted to each other in an organic and living way.³⁰

Our concepts are therefore true representations of reality, although they always remain more or less inadequate to reality. And they may equal and even exceed, in clearness of apprehension, our intuitions themselves.

We must not therefore speak of opposition between intuition and concept. Intuition and concept are not in any way opposed to each other. It is not sufficient even to say that they supplement or are useful to each other. They must be united by a process of mutual penetration, if we wish to have a

²⁹ Cf. St. Thomas, *Sum. Theol.*, I p. q. LXXXV, a. 5; *De Natura Verbi*, c. 1, etc. . . .

³⁰ St. Thomas, *De Ente et Essentia*.

truly human knowledge. The concept does not merely add itself to or substitute itself for the data of intuition, it penetrates into them and makes us understand them. If, in order to apprehend the fundamental elements of reality, the concept provisorily neglects the individual phenomena and conditions presented in intuition, it does not, however, deny their existence. It is in them that it finds the matter of its content, and under their control that it grows and renders itself explicit. And when our intelligence has thus apprehended the elements which constitute the nature of an object, it then reverts to the data of the senses with all their concrete determinations and arrives at an intellectual knowledge of the object in its individual reality. Such an operation is not pure intuition; it is more than an abstract conception; it is as it were an apprehension of reality in its individualized and actualized essence, through the mutual coöperation of the intuition and of the concept.

According to the new Empiricism, the concept is merely a useful instrument of action and communication, which we must put aside when we wish to come into direct contact with reality. Professor James points to the experience of the newly born babe or of the drugged man, etc. . . . as the type of experience in its native purity, unspoiled, as yet, by any mixture of concepts. So, Professor James would have us believe that human knowledge has its perfection in the undeveloped and the abnormal states of human nature, and that reflection is an instrument of deformation and error in human knowledge. This is truly too much for common sense to accept, and a system of genetic psychology which leads to such conclusions bears upon its face its own refutation. Professor Bergson would appeal rather to the so-called subconscious intuitions and sudden inspirations which appear to him to be the characteristics of genius, the source of the great scientific discoveries and the mark of true philosophical spirit. But if we study experimentally and psychologically these various facts and operations in their entirety, that is in their preparation, elaboration and production, as they have really taken

place, we shall easily see that, far from excluding concepts, they are the fruit of concept and reflection. What we call historical sense in great historians, literary taste in great literateurs, esthetic feeling in artists or political ability in statesmen, is constituted by concepts. They are the result and embodiment of accumulated reflections and analyses, the fruit of a multitude of concepts acquired, examined, elaborated and applied to reality. It is "by always thinking of it" that Newton discovered the law of gravitation. It is by a reflexive study of the nature and laws of things and in consequence of an incalculable amount of experiments, hypotheses, comparisons and generalizations that genius arrives at its discoveries. They are apparently sudden, but really of gradual growth. And it is only through numerous and successive experiments, often repeated and laboriously controlled, that fecund anticipations and hypotheses are born. Genius does not consist in dispensing with concepts, but rather in penetrating more deeply into their content and in apprehending more comprehensively their various relations. In every occasion it is the concept which animates, vivifies and directs human knowledge.

Professor Bergson displays his power of imagination and expression—which is great—in describing the efforts of the mind to deny itself and its attempts to live the life of pure intuition, by completely identifying itself with the continuous flowing of concrete phenomena. Truly one may ask what is the utility of our antecedent reflexions and of our scientific investigations, on which Professor Bergson insists so much, if we must leave them aside and throw ourselves into the whirlpool of pure intuition? What then becomes of our intelligence? It must disappear to give place to mere organic unconsciousness or sensualism where there is no place for thought and reflexion. It is the ruin of intellectual knowledge. In reality, if we wish to have a true knowledge of things, we must not absorb our intelligence into their materiality, but rather penetrate into their materiality by our reflexion and apprehend under their materiality the intelligible element which informs them. They have a specific nature with its

elements and laws of constitution and development. They are subject to a plan and realize a design. We cannot know them unless we apprehend these elements, these laws and this plan. And in order to apprehend them we have not to lose ourselves in them, but rather to strengthen the energy of our intelligence, to discover by our reflexions and represent by our concepts these intelligible elements which they realize in the concrete. Knowledge does not imply *identity* but *union* of the mind with the object. There must be indeed a certain process of assimilation between the knowing subject and the object known; and we must make that assimilation as perfect as possible. St. Thomas tells us that "to know an object is, in some way, to become that object," not, however, in its physical or natural entity, but mentally or, according to the scholastic expression, *intentionally*.³¹ And we cannot become an object and assimilate it truly, unless we apprehend its constitutive elements and fundamental laws through concepts.

Let us now summarize the true relations between intuition and the concept. Sense intuition is the beginning of all knowledge. It is through intuition that the whole matter of our knowledge is presented to the mind. It is in its data that our intelligence finds the content of its concepts and principles. It is under their direction and control that intelligence, through abstraction and reflexion, forms its divers concepts and judgments and builds up its theories and systems. It is to them that it finally reverts to verify the value of its elaboration and keep itself in contact with reality. But if intuition, as we may see, is necessary at every step of knowledge, at no step is it a sufficient factor to furnish the mind with a truly human knowledge, that is, with an intelligible and explanatory knowledge of anything. Its content is very rich but confused. We cannot apprehend the variety of its elements, their proper nature and relations, the principle which unifies and orders their multiplicity and variety, but by fragmentary analyses and successive syntheses, that is, through concepts. To use Kant's formula,

³¹ Cf. I p. q. XIV, a. 1; q. LXXXV, a. 2; *De Veritate*, q. VII, a. 6; *De Natura Verbi Intellectus*; I *De Anima*., lect. IV; lect. XII, etc. . . .

"our concepts without intuition are empty; and intuition without the concepts is blind." Through intuition we obtain an indistinct and confused mass of data; through the concepts we conceive a harmonious and integral whole with its fundamental relations and laws. Intuition presents the facts, the concept makes us understand them. It is only through their mutual coöperation that we can arrive at a true knowledge of reality in its constitution, laws and causes, that is, in its true nature. It is true that a perfect act of intuition which would apprehend immediately and clearly the whole of reality, without any analysis or reasoning, would be the highest and the most perfect act of knowledge. Such is the knowledge of God. Such is also, although infinitely inferior, the mode of knowledge of the angels.³² Such will be also our way of knowing in heaven; it will be a vision: the beatific vision. But in the present life, we depend for our knowledge on the material data of our senses. We are conditioned by matter and we cannot free ourselves from its exigency. We are necessarily subject to the limiting conditions of space and time. In every act of knowledge we have to rest on these material data. In order to rise above them and discover the higher laws of things and their ultimate causes, we have to use the concepts and be satisfied with them.

Such is the realistic Intellectualism of Aristotle and of St. Thomas. Professor Bergson acknowledges in it the fundamental principles of "the metaphysics natural to human intelligence."³³ It is indeed the traditional doctrine of knowledge. It is an integral part of the "*perennis philosophia*." It expresses the unchangeable principles of human knowledge; it accepts both the data of experience and the principles of reason, and firmly maintains their objective existence and value against the attacks of Idealism and Empiricism, old and new.

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³² See above, footnote 17.

³³ *L'Evolution Créatrice*, p. 352.

ADDISON AND THE MODERN ESSAY.¹

II.

The *Tatler* was brought to a close on January 2, 1711, and the general contemporary opinion was that Bickerstaff had written himself out. Swift, for example, thought that the paper had become "cruel dry and dull." Judge then of the surprise alike of connoisseurs and the reading public when on March 1, 1711—inside of two months—a new paper, the *Spectator*, made its appearance, to be published not three times, but six times, a week, and relying not on news but solely on the essay to awaken and hold attention. The price was one penny per number until August, 1712, when, in consequence of the halfpenny tax which proved fatal to so many other journals, the charge was increased to twopence. The supposed editor was an imaginary *Spectator*, of great taciturnity but keen powers of observation, admirably described by Addison in the first issue. The machinery for the conduct of the paper was provided by an equally imaginary club, the members of which, six in number, were sketched by Steele in No. 2. These were Sir Roger de Coverley, a Worcestershire gentleman, of ancient lineage and slightly eccentric behaviour, who, at 56, is still a bachelor because in youth he was crossed in love; a member of the Inner Temple, who is more deeply engaged in the criticism of stage plays than in the study of law, and much prefers Aristotle and Longinus to Littleton or Coke; Sir Andrew Freeport, a merchant of eminence in the city of London, well acquainted with commerce in all its parts, opposed to war, and fond of quoting maxims inculcating frugality; Captain Sentry, a retired soldier of great courage but invincible modesty and well stored with tales of adventure;

¹ The first part of this article appeared in the *Bulletin* for January, 1912.

Will Honeycomb, an elderly beau, who is an authority on fashions and thoroughly posted in the tittle-tattle of society; and a clergyman of delicate health, general learning, great sanctity of life, and the most exact good breeding. As the idea developed, Sir Roger was largely, but not entirely, taken over by Addison as his own, and in the immortal series of papers which form Addison's masterpiece, there grew gradually into being the most lovable fictitious character in English literature and, with the doubtful exception of Shakespeare's Falstaff, the most genuinely humorous figure that the annals of letters have to show.

The *Spectator* was designed to be a continuation of the *Tatler*, and it aimed at rendering similar services to reform in manners and morals. Its method was insensibly to correct and instruct by good-humouredly rallying and ridiculing the age on its vices and foibles and inconsistencies. Here, in particular, Addison shone. In the more serious Saturday essays, which became in time quite a recognized feature of the paper, he set himself to the production of a series of lay sermons, which are as edifying as they are charming to read. From this set of discourses a fairly satisfactory scheme of elementary theology and metaphysics, as well as of ethics, might be constructed. The existence and attributes of a Supreme Being, the dependence of man on God, the immortality of the soul, the loveliness of virtue, religion, devotion, piety, faith, hope, obedience, chastity, courage, hypocrisy, jealousy, temperance in food and drink, marriage, true happiness, force of habit, gratitude, cheerfulness, neglect of education, waste of time, desire of fame, vanity of earthly honours, death—these are a few of the themes which are so eloquently and so delightfully discussed. In the region of criticism Addison wrote about Milton and the Old Ballads, about Wit and Imagination, in a way that was at that time a revelation. But splendid as was his teaching in morals and criticism, his real forte lay in the direction of playful satire. His happiest efforts are seen in his innumerable sketches of the manners of the day and of individual types; in the allegories and Eastern apologues, in the handling of which he showed himself a wonderful adept; and in his "Horatian

pleasantry on fashionable follies, hoops, patches, or puppet shows."

It is not to be wondered at that a publication which so teemed with good things was a huge success. Everybody who was anybody clamoured to have the popular paper served at the breakfast table, and it was often read aloud for the assembled company. The highest normal circulation appears to have been about 14,000 copies daily; for some issues there was an extraordinary demand which ran the sales up to 20,000; and, when, at the end of a given period, the papers were collected and brought out in volumes, impressions of 10,000 copies of each volume were sold in England as rapidly as they could be printed, and there were, besides, separate editions for Dublin and Edinburgh.

With the 555th number (Saturday, December 6, 1712) the paper was brought to a close. The lion's share of the work had been done by Addison: he wrote 274 essays, and Steele 236, leaving only 45 for occasional contributors, such as Pope, Ambrose Philips, Tickell, Parnell, Eusden, and Hughes.

In the following March (March 12, 1713) Steele started, under the editorship of an imaginary Nestor Ironside, a third paper, the *Guardian*, which ran till October 1 of that year, reaching 175 numbers. To this periodical Addison, then busy with the preparations for the stage production of his tragedy of *Cato*, did not at first contribute, but when the paper was well under way he wrote for it fairly regularly. Other contributors were Pope, Berkeley, Tickell, Budgell, and Hughes. The *Guardian* is generally regarded as being duller than the *Spectator*, but its dullness is more relative than absolute. It is relieved by such delightful contributions from Addison as Simon Softly's Courtship (No. 97), the essays on the Tucker (No. 100) and the Art of Flying (No. 112), the Vision of Aurelia's Heart (No. 106), and the allegory of the Two Sexes (No. 152); nor are Steele's sketches of Nestor Ironside (No. 2) and the Lizard family (No. 5, 6, and 13) without considerable merit.

² Macaulay, *Essay on The Life and Writings of Addison* (July, 1843).

To the *Lover* (February 14 to May 27, 1714) and the *Reader* (April 22 to May 10, 1714), two of Steele's many minor periodicals, Addison contributed three or four papers.

On June 18, 1714, Addison, on his own account and without the co-operation of Steele, began a new series of the *Spectator*, which came out three times a week until December 20, 1714, and ran to 80 numbers, forming an eighth volume. In this publication, which was very largely Addison's own work, are contained some of the noblest as well as some of the most humorous essays in the English language.

Besides the more famous papers in which Addison was concerned he was responsible for three political periodicals, every number of which was the production of his own pen. In 1710, during the heat of the general election, he published the *Whig Examiner* (five numbers, September 14 to October 12), in which he crossed swords with St. John and the other Tory wits who were writing up the winning side with masterly journalism in the pages of the *Tory Examiner*. Swift had not yet been appointed to sole control of the latter paper, but he was probably behind its writers with his inspiration. Against even so formidable a combination Addison made a gallant showing. In fact, Johnson, himself a prejudiced Tory, speaks in the highest terms of the merits of the *Whig Examiner*. "On no occasion," he says, "was the genius of Addison more vigorously exerted, and on none did the superiority of his powers more evidently appear."³

A few years later, while the Rising of the "'15" in favour of the Old Pretender was still raging in Scotland, Addison undertook the defence of his party in the *Freeholder*, which reached 55 numbers (December 23, 1715, to June 29, 1716). Here he gives us the picture of the Tory Foxhunter, one of his most delightful sketches. The papers in which he depicted that celebrated character are not inferior in power to any of his satirical writings. The Tory Foxhunter had the honour of being the original of Fielding's Squire Western in *Tom Jones*, and thus

³ Johnson, *Lives of the Poets: Addison*.

establishes a distinct connection between the writings of Addison and the English Novel. In the *Freeholder*, too, we have the noble sketch of Lord Somers; and even in this partisan journal the genial writer found opportunity to show us glimpses of his old *Spectator* wit in his discussion of the vagaries of the Female Sex, French Anglophobia, and the Treatment of Authors.

Addison's last periodical publication was the *Old Whig* (two numbers, March 19 and April 2, 1719), which was called forth by Steele's attacks in *The Plebeian* on Sunderland's Peerage Bill. In these rival papers the two old friends attacked each other with considerable asperity; and it is a sad reflection on the mutability of human affairs that the breach thus caused in a friendship which had been so firm and so long maintained, and had produced consequences so momentous to morality and literature, was not wholly closed before death brought Addison's glorious career to an end on June 17, 1719, at the untimely age of 47.

No better answer to the modern catch-cry of "Art for Art's sake" need be sought than that supplied by the periodical papers we have been considering. Here, if anywhere, we see the highest art employed in one domain of English literature, and it was employed legitimately for the prime purpose of all art. Unless in those numbers that were professedly didactic, such for example as the criticisms on Milton, the main object of the essays contained in the *Tatler*, the *Spectator*, and the *Guardian* was to afford delight; but behind the trifling and the humour there was the serious purpose of the satirist to laugh coarseness and immorality out of existence. The very insidiousness of the method made it more effective than if hundreds of preachers had been thundering from every pulpit in the land. The reader who might have resented or neglected or forgotten the sermon was caught by the humour, the urbanity, the grace of the essay. Insensibly but surely the amelioration of conduct at which the satirists aimed was brought about, so that even to their contemporaries the results were visible. Gay, lamenting the recent decease of Isaac Bickerstaff, tells us:—

"It is incredible to conceive the effect his writings have had

on the town; how many thousand follies they have either quite banished, or given a great check to; how much countenance they have added to virtue and religion; how many people they have rendered happy, by shewing them it was their own fault if they were not so; and lastly, how entirely they have convinced our fops and young fellows of the value and advantages of learning.”⁴

Writing 132 years later Macaulay, in an eloquent passage, which I here transcribe, has more particularly summarized some of the effects of Addison’s periodical writings:—

“Of the service which his Essays rendered to morality it is difficult to speak too highly. It is true that, when the *Tatler* appeared, that age of outrageous profaneness and licentiousness which followed the Restoration had passed away. Jeremy Collier had shamed the theatres into something which, compared with the excesses of Etherege and Wycherley, might be called decency. Yet there still lingered in the public mind a pernicious notion that there was some connection between genius and profligacy, between the domestic virtues and the sullen formality of the Puritans. That error it is the glory of Addison to have dispelled. He taught the nation that the faith and the morality of Hale and Tillotson might be found in company with wit more sparkling than the wit of Congreve, and with humour richer than the humour of Vanbrugh. So effectually, indeed, did he retort on vice the mockery which had recently been directed against virtue, that, since his time, the open violation of decency has always been considered among us as the mark of a fool. And this revolution, the greatest and most salutary ever effected by any satirist, he accomplished, be it remembered, without writing one personal lampoon.”⁵

We are on this occasion, however, more particularly concerned perhaps with the literary effect of the periodicals with which Addison was associated. I have already pointed out how in one or two instances they influenced the novel. In fact, the *Spectator* may be regarded as the direct forerunner of the

⁴ Gay, *Present State of Wit*.

⁵ Macaulay, *op. cit.*

novel as written by Richardson and Fielding, in contradistinction to the fictitious narrative as written by Defoe. The character sketching, the description of scenes of everyday life, the numerous incidents told in so lively, graphic, and humorous or pathetic a manner, the interest arising from the repeated entrances, exits, and re-entrances of the same personages exhibit all the elements of the modern novel except plot. Had there been a plot, the modern novel would have been ushered in full-fledged, but then of course the essay character would have been lost; and everyone of taste and sensibility will be content to know and love the Essays as they are.

In the department of the Essay itself the influence of Addison—and of Steele, for, *pace* Macaulay, they cannot really be separated—made itself immediately felt, and the effect was not ephemeral but lasting. It has been a constant and positive quantity in literature down to our own day. Naturally the success of the Steele-Addison publications, if it produced no serious rival, yet raised up a host of imitators. I have counted no fewer than 221 periodicals, exclusive of newspapers, that appeared in England in the century following the *Tatler*, that is, from 1709 to 1809. We have the *Gazette A-La-Mode*, the *Whisperer*, the *Growler*, the *Grumbler*, the *Weekly Medley*, the *Trifler*, the *Ranger*, *et hoc genus omne*. Of those which appeared in England and in English-speaking countries in the next hundred years, from 1809 to 1909, the name is legion. And the observant student of literary history cannot fail to be struck by the extent to which magazines and reviews have served as nursing mothers to foster nascent genius. In the case of hundreds of the greatest English litterateurs of the nineteenth century the tale is told how they first sought and obtained recognition in the magazine or review, and, after their names had become famous, how often they were glad to fall back on the same medium for the expression of their views. In this respect the debt owed by the republic of letters to the inventors and first writers of the Periodical Essay is beyond computation.

Of the early imitations of the Steele-Addison publications

many were confined to politics, and few possessed much merit, so that now even their names are known only to delvers in the antique. We are not brought to a pause by any special features until we come to Johnson's *Rambler* (1750-52) and *Idler* (1758-60). Great, however, as from certain points of view is the merit of these two series of essays, there are wanting in the ponderosity of the leviathan of literature those airy graces and genialities, that sparking humour, and that lightness of touch which had distinguished the pioneers. Far more like the original in spirit and execution, in thought and style, were Goldsmith's *Bee* (1759) and *Citizen of the World* (1762), as well as the articles he contributed to the *Busy Body* (1759), the *Lady's Magazine* (1759), the *British Magazine* (1759-60), and the *Public Ledger* (1760). The tradition was more or less worthily maintained in such publications as the *Adventurer* (1752), the *World* (1753), the *Connoisseur* (1754), the *Mirror* (1779), the *Lounger* (1785), the *Observer* (1785), and the *Looker-on* (1792). Then comes the era of the great quarterlies and the well known magazines and reviews, the volume of which has received new accretions with each succeeding year. Out of the outstanding phenomena which the future historian of English literature will have to notice and explain will be the dominance of the magazine in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, and, however tortuous and winding the path he has to follow may appear, he will not have done all his duty until he has traced it to its starting point in the office of the *Tatler* in the London of Queen Anne.

If the effect of the *Tatler* and its companion papers on literary production was great at home, it was scarcely less pronounced abroad. Many European languages were pressed into service to give expression to the new-found form of literature, and in French, German, Dutch, Swedish, Danish, and Italian, periodical essays on the English model were rapidly forthcoming. Throughout the eighteenth century, and well on into the nineteenth, publications of this type were made at such centres as Paris, Berlin, Copenhagen, Stockholm, the Hague, Amsterdam, Hamburg, Leipzig, Zürich, Nuremberg, Dresden,

Leyden, Frankfort, Zelle, Eisenach, Hanover, Göttingen, Breslau, Flensburg, Milan, and Venice. As if to leave no doubt regarding the source of inspiration, the very title was in many cases borrowed. Thus we have *Le Spectateur françois*; *Le Spectateur suisse*; *Le Spectateur danois*; *Le Spectateur belge*; *Le Spectateur en Prusse*; the *Hollandsche Spectator*; *Der allgemeine Zuschauer*; *Der nordische Aufseher*; *L'Osservatore*; *Lo Spettatore Italiano*; the *Nydanske tilskoer*; *Le Babillard*; *Der Freimüthige Tadler*; *De Babbelaer*; and *Der Getreue Hofmeister*. In America the influence of Steele and Addison is first noticeable in the *New England Courant* after it came under the direction of Benjamin Franklin, but in this country as elsewhere that influence has been of the abiding kind. Even in such an out-of-the-way place as Honolulu there appeared a *Hawaiian Spectator* in 1838-9. It is obvious that the question of the foreign influence of the three great classical periodicals cannot be more than mentioned within the limits of a paper of this kind; but it is a fruitful subject which will well repay investigation and, in my opinion, it certainly lends itself to sympathetic treatment.

So far, I have, in the main, been treating of Addison and Steele conjointly, because, so far, it has been impossible to separate them, nor was it necessary or advisable to do so. But, the title of this article borne in mind, it seems proper that I should now devote a little space to Addison alone.

Addison once expressed the wish that, as it was said of Socrates that he brought philosophy down from heaven to inhabit among men, so it might be said of himself that he had "brought philosophy out of closets and libraries, schools and colleges, to dwell in clubs and assemblies, at tea-tables, and in coffee-houses."⁶ It has been alleged against him, however, that his own philosophy was not very deep. There is a substratum of truth in that objection; but the answer to it is that the state of education and culture of the public to which he addressed himself had to be considered. He wanted to attract,

⁶ *Spectator*, No. 10, Monday, March 12, 1711.

not repel. He was bound not to write over the heads of his readers, or his paper and his mission would alike fail. He had to convey his lessons gently, gradually, insensibly; to make them easily understood, so that he who ran might read; to depend on iteration of the same instruction in many forms. His philosophy had to be administered in homeopathic rather than in heroic doses. With or without the leave of manufacturers of huge and learned treatises, I venture to say that it is at least arguable that he who distributes philosophy in solution, so that the multitude may readily absorb it without knowing it, renders a better, and certainly a more immediate, service to society than he who piles it up into ungainly slabs and stores it in receptacles to which none but the privileged few can have access. I hold it true, whate'er befall, that one Dickens is worth a score of Jeremy Bentham's. If we bear in mind these considerations, we shall be the more readily disposed to accept Addison as he is, and to hold unto him as righteousness that purposeful shallowness which is more apparent than real. As the adapter of the means to the end he is unrivalled in literature.

As a literary critic Addison was condemned in Johnson's day because his criticism was tentative or experimental, rather than scientific, and because he decided by taste rather than by principles; and in our own day, because he is commonplace and unoriginal. Yet his eleven papers on the Pleasures of the Imagination⁷ form, in fact, the earliest specimens of philosophical criticism in the English language. That his ideas were correct may be inferred from his essay on fine taste, and especially from that passage in which he tells us that the best way to develop it is to be conversant among the writings of the most polite authors, and from that other passage in which he says:—

“It is likewise necessary for a man who would form to himself a finished taste of good writing, to be well versed in the works of the best critics, both ancient and modern. I must

⁷ *Spectator*, Nos. 411–421, June 21 to July 3, 1712.

confess that I could wish there were authors of this kind, who, beside the mechanical rules, which a man of very little taste may discourse upon, would enter into the very spirit and soul of fine writing, and show us the several sources of that pleasure which rises in the mind upon the perusal of a noble work.”⁸

This he himself attempted to do for Milton and the Old Ballads, and his popularization of the great Puritan poet and the removal of obloquy from the Ballads did much to pave the way for the oncoming of the Romantic movement.

In wit, in humour, in power of invention Addison stands preëminent. Assuredly Macaulay does not overstate the case when he says that in wit, properly so called, Addison was not inferior to Cowley or Butler; that Addison’s humour is of a more delicious flavour than the humour of either Swift or Voltaire; and that, if we wish to find anything more vivid than Addison’s best portraits, we must go either to Shakespeare or Cervantes. This is high praise; but if any one doubts whether it is deserved, let him search the *Essays*, *passim*.

As a stylist Addison is master of an easy, smooth-flowing, and apparently artless prose. He has been the model on which most of our best writers have endeavoured to form themselves. His influence in this department has made itself felt through practically the whole range of English prose since his time, from Oliver Goldsmith and Horace Walpole to Walter Pater, and from Leigh Hunt and Washington Irving to Robert Louis Stevenson and Andrew Lang. It may not be inappropriate here to mention that the Chancellor of the Catholic University of America, the cardinal-archbishop of Baltimore, made Addison his favourite author in youth, and that it is to imitation of Addison’s style that in no small measure is to be attributed the clearness and cogency of those admirable books of his which have been so widely read and translated, and on which Archbishop Glennon of St. Louis recently pronounced so magnificent a panegyric. Even writers like Charles Lamb, who go back to the Elizabethans for inspiration, cannot wholly escape the

⁸ *Spectator*, No. 409, Thursday, June 19, 1712.

infection of the later model. There are passages in Lamb that are quite Addisonian. Addison's style has stood the test of time, and he still offers the almost perfect pattern for us to copy. On this point Johnson's dictum remains as true to-day as when he penned it 130 years ago:—

“Whoever wishes to attain an English style, familiar, but not coarse, and elegant, but not ostentatious, must give his days and nights to the volumes of Addison.”⁹

* * *

A few months ago I handled and inspected, with mingled feelings, the original copies of the *Tatler*, the *Spectator*, and the *Guardian* in the great reading room of the library of the British Museum in London. One day I went from the library and had a good look at the statue of Queen Anne in front of St. Paul's Cathedral, taking in all its details of sceptre and brocade, of stomacher and massive hoops. I then passed, by way of Ludgate Hill, Fleet Street, the Strand, and Whitehall, to Westminster Abbey, following the same route as Mr. Spectator and Sir Roger de Coverley had taken on the occasion of their celebrated pilgrimage. With them I looked at Sir Cloudesley Shovel's monument and Dr. Busby's tomb, at the Coronation Chairs and Edward the Third's sword, and at the other statues and trophies among the tombs of the Kings. In the North Aisle of King Henry the Seventh's chapel I stood at the foot of Addison's grave, and then I turned to Poet's Corner to admire the skilfully wrought image which public veneration has raised to his memory. There I fell to thinking how deep the malice is that goes beyond the grave, and to wondering how much of Pope's satire, mingled as it is with genuine praise, is true. The famous lines, which Macaulay says everybody knows, or ought to know, by heart, occur in the *Epistle to Dr. Arbuthnot*. Pope has been scarifying Gildon and Dennis, Bentley and Tibalds, Namby-Pamby Philips and Nahum Tate. He waves them aside, and then breaks out into this sustained piece of declamation:—

⁹ Johnson, *op. cit.*

Peace to all such! but were there One whose fires
 True Genius kindles, and fair Fame inspires;
 Blest with each talent and each art to please,
 And born to write, converse, and live with ease:
 Should such a man, too fond to rule alone,
 Bear, like the Turk, no brother near the throne,
 View him with scornful, yet with jealous eyes,
 And hate for arts that caus'd himself to rise;
 Damn with faint praise, assent with civil leer,
 And without sneering, teach the rest to sneer;
 Willing to wound, and yet afraid to strike,
 Just hint a fault, and hesitate dislike;
 Alike reserv'd to blame, or to commend;
 A tim'rous foe, and a suspicious friend;
 Dreading ev'n fools, by Flatterers besieg'd,
 And so obliging, that he ne'er obliged;
 Like *Cato*, give his little Senate laws,
 And sit attentive to his own applause;
 While Wits and Templars ev'ry sentence raise,
 And wonder with a foolish face of praise:—
 Who but must laugh, if such a man there be?
 Who would not weep, if ATTICUS were he?

I have a high admiration for Pope, which has grown with my growth and strengthened with my strength, and I sat at the feet of a revered preceptor, now alas! gathered to his fathers, who, though an Oxford Tory of the most reactionary type, had yet a consuming love for Addison, and instilled it into others, and particularly into those of us whom he treated as his favourite disciples. From him I learned to regard Addison almost as the just man made perfect. And yet, what of the mean indictments contained in the lines I have just quoted: "damn with faint praise"; "teach the rest to sneer"; "willing to wound and yet afraid to strike"; "reserv'd to commend"; "a suspicious friend"; "sit attentive to his own applause"? Frankly, I don't know. There were between the two men certain passages at arms¹⁰ which might easily move to spite the great master of barbed and pointed satire. Yet I cannot bring myself to think that it is mere mendacity that dictated the series of stinging charges that Pope here makes against

¹⁰ On this point see my article on "Alexander Pope," in *The Catholic Encyclopedia*, Vol. XII., pp. 258-260.

Addison: littlenesses all of them, mark you, but such littlenesses as no generous spirit would willingly plead guilty to. I suppose that to Addison's unfriendly contemporaries there appeared to be some basis for them all—which is no more than saying that he had his share of human weaknesses. Well, if he had, we will I think, you and I, be disposed to forgive them to the charming writer who set his mark indelibly on English prose; the accomplished essayist who helped to open up new regions of literature; the gentle but effective satirist who reformed his own and set the standard for other ages; the kindly humourist who by his genial optimism taught the true philosophy of life, and bequeathed to posterity a rich inheritance more precious than gold and jewels and destined to be more lasting than granite or bronze. As was once, on a solemn occasion, said of a distinguished fellow-countryman of my own: "Let not his frailties be remembered: he was a very great man."

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JOHN THE SCOT.

The man who deserves to be singled out as representative of the ninth century in the history of philosophy is the Irishman known to his contemporaries as John the Scot and now generally called John Scotus Eriugena. He is representative, however, not of the average, nor of the usual, but of the highest and the best that that century produced in the way of original speculation. Indeed, he was so far above the average of that century that he may be said to have stood alone. It is part of the mystery that surrounds his personality, that he appears unheralded, shines for a period in the very zenith of the world of thought, and then disappears as suddenly and as mysteriously as he came. He had no rivals of the same rank as his, he had no co-workers equal to him in ability; he formed no school in the strict sense of the word; he "voyaged through strange seas of thought *alone*."

The ninth century began very auspiciously with that wonderful awakening to education and culture known as the Carolingian Revival. Charlemagne, that doughty champion of Christendom and wise, far-seeing organizer of the Christian state, whom legend exalted into the hero of many an extraordinary feat of arms, and whom local tradition in his favorite city of Aachen elevated to the rank of Christian saint, was a generous and devoted friend of learning. He gathered around him scholars from every country in Europe, encouraged them in their literary tasks, even took part in their debates, and showered honors and emoluments on them. Alcuin from England and Clement from Ireland came into closest personal contact with the emperor. Others, like Rhabanus of Fulda and Mainz, Fredegis the Anglo-Saxon and Candidus the German were influenced by the Masters of the Palace School. But, none of these were original thinkers. They did useful service to the cause of learning by their effort to revive and preserve what

previous ages had handed down. In theology and philosophy St. Augustine was their standard authority, and their writings very often consist of mere excerpts from his works. Charlemagne on one occasion showed his disappointment at their lack of originality. For, though he himself was no scholar, and could hardly write his own name—the hand that wielded the good sword “Joyeuse” could not easily acquire the skill to hold the pen—he appreciated scholarship in others, and would have admired a genius “like Jerome and Augustine,” forgetting, until Alcuin reminded him, that “the Lord of Heaven and earth” had the sending of so great geniuses as those in the secret designs of His Providence. The Lord did not send them in Charles’s time. Nor in the days of his immediate successors. In fact, the rulers who, after the death of Charlemagne, reigned over the empire which he so unwisely divided among them, were too weak and indolent, or too much concerned with less worthy projects, to champion the cause of learning, or take an interest in educational matters. Charles the Bald, who began to rule in 840, and was crowned Emperor in 875, seemed alone to inherit his grandfather’s love of learning. He surrounded himself with scholars, and seemed to enjoy their company almost as much as his grandfather had. Among these scholars, too, there was a dismal dearth of original power. The single notable exception was John the Scot, who, as we realize now from the study of his works, was a man of extraordinary genius and of an originality that would have been rare in any age, but was almost miraculous in the age to which he belonged.

His age appreciated his gifts. It is all the more remarkable, therefore, that there is so little known about him. A search, minute and painstaking, through all the documents that have reached us and through his own works results in a keen disappointment so far as information about him is concerned. It is certain that he was born in Ireland, and even that much we know only by inference. The name “Scot”—he was never mentioned by contemporaries except as “John the Scot”—should not mislead us. In the ninth century a “Scot” was an

Irishman. The name Eriugena by which he designated himself, is now understood by all scholars to mean "Native of Ireland." When he was born, and in what part of Ireland; when and why he left his native land; whether he journeyed to France of his own free will or was summoned by Charles the Bald, as Alcuin had been by Charlemagne; whether he was a cleric or a monk or a layman—all these questions remain unanswered, and probably will remain unanswered, unless some new documents are discovered. All we know is that, about the year 847, he appeared at the Court of Charles the Bald and was received at once into royal favor. His knowledge of Greek was quite unusual for that day and generation. It brought him into prominence in many ways, especially by procuring for him a royal invitation to translate into Latin the Greek writings ascribed to Dionysius the Areopagite, which had recently been sent as a present from the Greek Emperor to Louis the Pious, father of Charles. His reputation for learning and the prominence that his translation brought him secured for him also an invitation to join the controversies then raging about Predestination and about the Eucharist. We still have his work on Predestination and some of the answers it provoked. The age was a rough one, and the style of polemical literature was not what one might call polite. The reproaches flung in bitter mood and in violent language by the opponents of John the Scot are among the few scanty materials for our knowledge of his personality. One adversary plainly tells him to go back to Ireland where he got his reputation for learning, to the "Ultima Thule," that remote region. Another virulently refers to his doctrine as "Irish porridge" (*pultes scottorum*), and a third upbraids him with his lack of ecclesiastical dignity or status. He himself could be violent of language too. For Gotteschalk, the monk accused of heresy in the question of predestination, he has no sentiment of pity, and though he himself was to be condemned later as a heretic, he considers heresy a most heinous crime and worthy of the severest punishment. It is certain that he did not spend all of his time at the royal court. For, we know that he was one of an Irish colony of schol-

ars at Laon, where Greek and theology was studied and where, probably, he wrote his greatest work, the philosophical treatise "On the Division of Nature." He survived his patron, Charles, who died in 877. But whether he remained the rest of his life in France or returned to his native Ireland is, again, a matter of uncertainty. The legend that he went to England at the invitation of Alfred the Great and was associated with him in the foundation of a great school at Oxford is devoid of all historical proof, and seems to rest on a case of mistaken identity.

Tradition, whether it is reliable or not is another question, ascribes to him an eager, ardent nature, a frailness of body, and a truly Celtic nimbleness of wit. Everyone knows the story of his quickness at repartee. His royal patron, like Charlemagne, was not above badgering a scholar for the amusement of his guests. One day, when John was seated opposite him at table he asked the philosopher in apparent seriousness, "What difference is there (*quid distat*) between a Scot and a Sot." "Only the table, your Majesty," was the ready answer. This venerable anecdote shows among other things that John was no sycophant, and if his poems addressed to the Emperor are full of hyperbolic praise, the fault lay not so much with the poet as with the fashions of the time. Turning to the writings of Eriugena we are able to add to these meager and trivial details and draw a tolerably complete picture of the mental, if not of the physical, characteristics of the man. The staid monkish chronicler to whom we owe the story of John's witticism goes on to say: "He deviated from the path of the Latins, while he kept his eyes intently fixed on the Greeks: wherefore he was reputed a heretic." Several centuries before John's time this predilection for the Greeks was laid to the charge of his fellow-countrymen on the continent. The fact seems to be that there was a kinship of the spirit between the Greek theologians and the Celts. Some historians surmise that there was actual dependence of the ancient Irish church on the Alexandrians in the matter of institutions and ideas. However this may be, we see in the writings of Eriugena the natural affinity of the Celt and the Greek. We have only to contrast

them both with the Latin to see how closely they resemble each other. The Celt excelled in spiritual imaginativeness; he had the power of grasping the reality of the invisible and making it part of his real self. He was inclined to live largely in the thought of the otherworld, and, consequently, to put contemplation above action. He laid hold of Christianity from the side of its ideals, not from the side of its legal prescriptions. He appreciated the force of an inspiration more than he did the restriction of definite formulas. The Celtic theologian took the Gospel of St. John for his favorite text, and the Celtic philosopher found in Platonism the philosophy which exactly suited his intellectual temper. John the Scot lived in the century which witnessed the great schism of the Greek from the Latin Church. Throughout the continent the feeling of hostility was deep and uncompromising. Ecclesiastics in France, where he lived, naturally felt with Rome, and looked with some suspicion on everything Greek. It was characteristic of the Celt to disregard practical and institutional considerations. It was not out of lack of loyalty, as will be made clear later on. It was merely that such considerations did not enter the mind of the Platonic philosopher. Greek theology called to him as to a kindred spirit, and he "deviated from the path of the Latins, while he kept his eyes intently fixed on the Greeks." The Platonic world of ideas was more important to him than the real actual world of events; he lived in it; it was his home and, in a sense, his all. He had no reason to distrust it, since it came to him so well recommended, and if in it he lost his sense of orthodoxy, it was because he lacked the ability to see the practical as his opponents, the Latins, saw it.

The Platonic view came to him principally through the works of Pseudo-Dionysius, which he translated into Latin. Dionysius, as is well known, was an Athenian whom St. Paul converted to Christianity. Tradition identified him with the Dionysius who preached the Gospel in France, and, as Saint Denis, became one of the patrons of that country. A number of works written in Greek were ascribed to him, and it was these that the Greek Emperor Michael sent to Louis the Pious, father of

Charles the Bald—a “Greek gift,” one might say, considering the tense feeling existing between Constantinople and Rome. The whole Greek church believed that the works were written by the disciple of St. Paul. France very readily fell in with the belief, and John the Scot never for a moment doubted their authenticity. It is nowadays, however, a very easy task to show that the writings in question cannot date from the first century, and most scholars agree that they did not see the light until about the year 500. They may have been written by a monk named Dionysius and then, in the good faith of uncritical enthusiasm, ascribed to the Areopagite; or they may have been knowingly and purposely forged. Such things happened before and since. In any case, John the Scot thought that they were genuine, and their effect on his mental development was immediate and decisive. They opened up to him a world of intellectual abstractions and spiritual entities which appealed to his Celtic temperament and suited the bent of his mind which was naturally Platonic. Imagine an enthusiastic botanist introduced to some unusually rich collection of the rarest specimens of plant life, imagine a mechanical genius given his first opportunity to examine at his leisure a vast number of new and cleverly contrived mechanical devices, or a natural born musician admitted to his first experience of the best and most finished products of the great master composers, and you have some idea of how this ardent young Irishman revelled in the limitless region of immaterial entities into which the Pseudo-Dionysius introduced him. It was the Greek taking the Celt by the hand and leading him into a paradise of supreme intellectual satisfaction and untold spiritual delight. But John the Scot was not willing to be merely a disciple. He himself would become a leader. And so, he not only translated the mystic writings of the Greek and commented on them but also composed a great metaphysical treatise of his own, his work *On the Division of Nature*.

It would, I am convinced, be fruitless for any but a trained student of metaphysics to attempt the thorough study of the dialogue on the Division of Nature. Not that the style is

obscure. On the contrary, John wrote a Latin that is lucid as well as elegant. His style was vastly superior to that of his contemporaries. But the thought is of that sustained subtlety and sublimity that characterizes the masterpieces of the great metaphysicians. Metaphysics, all of us realize, is a strenuous study, and not to be undertaken at all except by those who are not afraid of sustained mental effort. Nevertheless, the broad outlines of the system of John the Scot may be made intelligible without very great difficulty.

The word "Nature" as used by John the Scot is synonymous with "Reality." Nature, he teaches, is fourfold. First, there is "Nature which creates and is not created." This is God, the source and principle of all things. Secondly, there is "Nature which is created and creates." This is the world of primordial causes, the world of archetypal ideas existing in the mind of God, the world of types or models according to which all things are made. Thirdly, there is "Nature which is created and does not create," namely the world of phenomena, nature as we understand it, the physical universe and all the contingent, changing, evanescent material things which for the untrained mind is the real world, but for the philosopher of the idealist school, is the least real of all. Fourthly, there is "Nature which neither creates nor is created." This is God the Term or final end towards which all things are tending. It is important that we should try to grasp these distinctions. Perhaps we had better discard the somewhat confusing phrases, "Creates and is not created," etc. There are, then, four divisions of reality. God the Source, and God the final end of all things, the first and the fourth division, are easily understood. The third, too, is easily understood, if we call it by its more usual name, the physical world. The second division is one with which we are not so familiar, it is the world of Ideas that Plato spoke about. We are to imagine it to consist of perfect idealistic types of all things that exist here below. There, in that world of Ideas, is Justice, absolute, unchangeable, undiminished, unending. There is perfect Beauty, Beauty without flaw or imperfection, Beauty infinite and eternal.

There, too, are the perfect realizations of all those things which exist here below in imperfect forms. Suppose, like Diogenes of old, you are looking for an honest man. You will find him, if your standard of honesty is not too rigid. But you will not find perfect honesty in this world, you will not find *honesty itself*. For no matter how honest a man may be, his honesty is only a participation of the perfect, absolute, unchanging type of honesty which there, in the world above us, exists without participation or imperfection of any kind. This is how Plato conceived the world of Ideas. John the Scot agrees with the Platonic view. But, instead of assigning that world of Ideas to a "region above the heavens," giving it, if not a local habitation, at least, a separate existence, John, like all the Christian Platonists, places this world of Ideas in the mind of God. So that God, the source, God the final end, and God containing the ideal types of things are one and the same. This is the doctrine of Christian theism generally, and not of any particular school of Platonism and Neo-Platonism. What is peculiar to John the Scot is the doctrine that the first and the third divisions of Nature are identical. God the Source of all things is identical with the physical universe. This is, of course, pantheism. And, in spite of the efforts that have been made to exonerate our philosopher from the charge of pantheism, notwithstanding whatever sympathy we may have with him as an unusually attractive personality, we must admit that the case is only too clear against him. "The being of all things," he says, over and over again, "is the Overbeing of God." This is pantheism, and is an essential part of the system we are studying. It is, indeed, interesting to note the swaying of the philosophic mind from extreme atheism to explicit pantheism. The first philosophies were pantheistic. There came ages of scepticism and materialism which drew the pendulum across to the opposite, atheism; but, over and over again, metaphysical speculation and poetic enthusiasm for nature carried it inevitably back to pantheism. "All things are full of Gods," the first Greek philosopher is said to have taught. "All things are God" is the conclusion of reflective philosophy wherever the

light of personal faith failed to shed light on the problem of God and the universe.

For John the Scot, therefore, Reality in all its four divisions is God. In the beginning, Reality was, as it were, a folded scroll, included in the ineffable oneness of the Godhead. Creation is the unfolding of that scroll, first in the world of Ideas and then in the physical universe. And the end of all things will be the rolling up of that scroll into the Divine Nature. Creation, or more technically, emanation, is the beginning of the world's history; reabsorption in God, or the final return of all things to God, is the last chapter in that history. The philosopher himself furnishes an illustration which serves to throw light on his theory of reality. Let us imagine he says a point from which several lines radiate in different directions like the spokes of a wheel. The point is God, the source of all things, Whose nature is essentially and ineffably one. In that oneness, however, was the light of intelligence and the warmth of infinite Goodness. It is the nature of light to spread its radiance, and of Goodness to diffuse itself. Therefore it is of the Nature of God to shed around Him, an aura, so to speak, of Ideas and of Forces, *θεία θελήματα*. If, now, we draw a circle around the point at a short distance from it, all that lies within that circle will be Ideas and Forces, the world of primordial types, represented by lines radiating from the One. If, next, we draw a larger circle, having the point once more for its center, all between the second circumference and the first will be the world of concrete, physical, phenomena. When the outstreaming, as the Germans call it, from God will have reached this line, it will cease, and the process of return to God will begin.

Let us see how Eriugena describes this return to God,—the most intelligible and the most picturesque portion of all his philosophy. In the descent from God a definite order was followed. First came Ideas, from these came forces, from forces, matter in all its descending grades to the lowest form, the dust of the earth. When the final return begins, this order will be inverted. The dust of the earth will assume some sort of organ-

ization in the mineral, the mineral will become the elements, the elements will become light, light will become life, life will become sense, sense will become reason, reason will sublimate in intellect, intellect will become ideas, and in the form of ideas all will be reabsorbed in God. Signs of this great cosmic reabsorption are evident everywhere around us: the sphere of the heavens revolving on its axis returns to the same place in twenty-four hours; the sun completing its journey along the ecliptic (*equinoctiale diametrum*) returns in four years to the point which it now occupies; the seasons return each in its own time; the periodic recurrence of the tides is in line with the same phenomena; plant life exhibits the same regularity in the return of leaf and flower and fruit at their appointed seasons. The fact is, says our philosopher, that the *end* of every natural motion is the same as the *beginning*. The truths of nature, he adds, are intended to be a sign of higher spiritual and intellectual truth, and thus the periodicity of natural phenomena is a symbol of the great cosmic cycle of all reality *from God to God*. Remark here the universality of this return. Not only will the human soul go back at last to God Who is its home, but also the human body, and, not only the human body but all bodies whatsoever, even animals, plants and minerals. They will not return, however, in their proper species. Each has to be spiritualized first. The lower must become the higher, the material must be immaterialized, the gross must become refined, the foul must become fair, the base the ignoble, the sordid must become exalted, noble and sublime; for the inapproachable light in which the Godhead dwells will not admit to its presence anything that is dark, and the sanctity of God will not harbor anything that is unholy. The process is, therefore, one of purification and sanctification. And, although it is a natural, cosmic process, it is effected through the redemptive merits of Christ. This, as theologians will recognize at once, is the celebrated doctrine of the Alexandrian Christian Platonists, especially of Origen. It is the doctrine of final *apocatastasis*, the universal redemption by Christ of all created nature—a doctrine on which the Official Church set

the stamp of her disapproval on more than one occasion. John the Scot was not sensitive to the heterodoxy of his Pseudo-Dionysius on this point. The view of all nature as a symbol of the supernatural appealed to his disposition; his poetic soul was charmed at the prospect thus held out to him, and his spiritual imaginativeness was quite equal to the task of looking beyond the physical and seeing the spiritual meaning of it all. One could not say that the sun, the moon, the tides, the recurrent seasons, the periodic succession of leaf and flower and fruit were mere facts to him—"just that and nothing more." They were so much more than facts that they were hardly facts at all. They were symbols, and as symbols alone, one might almost say, they interested him. The same is true of scriptural facts. The story of what happened in the Garden of Eden has for him a predominantly, perhaps an exclusively, spiritual meaning. Adam and Eve he understands to mean mind and sensibility. The temptation and the fall mean the luring away of mind by our sense-nature from the higher pleasures of reason to the lower pleasures of sense. "In sorrow shalt thou bring forth children" indicates the efforts which, once man has yielded to the pleasures of sense, are necessary in order to attain the highest knowledge.

This predominantly symbolical view of Nature and of sacred history has its roots in a temperament that is thoroughly idealistic. John the Scot was one of those for whom the spiritual is more real than the material, the world of thought more important than the world of sense. Far from being a materialist, he was a pronounced idealist, almost modern, indeed, in the value that he attaches to *thoughts in comparison with things*. For him, the least real of all the divisions of Nature is the physical world. It would hardly be correct to say that he doesn't believe in the existence of the physical world. But he does say that the existence of the physical world consists in *being thought*: "Intellectus enim rerum veraciter res ipsae sunt." (*De Div. Nat.*, II, col. 538). Things are, therefore, thoughts, and facts are true only in so far as they are thought to be true. This, of course, would lead to scepticism:

each man would make his own truth and that would *be* true which would seem to be true. John the Scot is saved from this consequence of his idealism by the reflection that the thought which dominates and compels our thought is the thought by which God thinks the world. The divine thought is not haphazard or inconsistent or self-contradictory. Consequently, the world is not a chaos but a cosmos, and if we think rightly, we follow the thought by which God thinks, and so are saved from Scepticism. It is, we may think, if not a narrow escape, at least an escape by a ladder which few can climb, a ladder leading to dizzy metaphysical heights which few can reach without danger of losing their mental balance. We are interested here in the general point of view, which, as has been said, is thoroughly and frankly idealistic. Our ninth century philosopher talks like a Modern Hegel or a Bradley: things are thoughts, the thoughts, not of my mind nor of yours, but of the Absolute Mind, of the mind of God, so that their only meaning is a showing-forth (*theophania*) of God and His Nature.

The discussion of the nature of man brings out still more strikingly the idealistic temperament of John the Scot. It is true, I think, that for the average person the body is more real than the soul. That is the view, at any rate, of the materialist, and most people think materialistically until they are trained to think otherwise. It is safe to say that for one person who doubts whether he has a body there are thousands who doubt they have a soul. Indeed, no one naturally doubts that he has a body, however he may be troubled with the question whether he has a soul. The idealist, like John the Scot, inverts this order of importance. He is certain that he has a soul, and interprets his body in terms of the soul. For what is the body? However you describe it, you describe it in terms of quantity and quality. You will have to refer to its height, to its weight, to its color, to its texture, to its functions and activities. But, all these are "incorporeal," that is to say, they are really your thoughts. The soul it is that *thinks* size and weight and color and so forth. Nay more, the soul it is that organizes these

qualities into a kind of unity, by articulating them into the complex conception called "body." Hence, says our philosopher, the *soul creates its own body*. Here we have, not a paradox, but a perfectly logical and a decidedly courageous conclusion from the principles of idealism. "The soul creates its own body," what a setback to materialism that persistently claims the dependence of the soul on the body. And, how modern! Not only does it suggest the doctrine of Absolute Idealism, but the still better known dogma of the faith-curists and the theosophists. The unreality of pain, the non-existence of disease, the contention that suffering is an error of the mind and belief in the body a mistake on the part of the soul—all these find their justification in the contention that the body is a creation of the soul. And this agreement between the ninth and the twentieth century idealist is not so difficult to explain. There is much in the writings of those contemporary idealists to whom I have referred that is borrowed from early Christian heretical sources, and that means ultimately from Neo-Platonic sources from which John the Scot drew his materials.

With idealism there goes very naturally a sturdy optimism. Our philosopher believes to the fullness of the letter that

"Somehow good
Will be the final goal of ill."

This is implied in the final return of all reality to God. But what interests us most is the explanation and justification of his conviction that good will triumph over evil. Evil is, to his mind, more apparent than real. For, all reality is God. Unfortunately it is only a few highly privileged souls that grasp this truth. The rest, living in darkness, failing to see the light, make a distinction between God and what they call evil. Evil will disappear as soon as intellectual and spiritual darkness disappear; the annihilation of evil will be the realization that it does not exist. Here, as is evident, John the Scot gave a reason, as William of Malmesbury says to be "reputed a heretic." But, before we set him down as a heretic let us examine more closely the general question of his orthodoxy.

John the Scot was several times condemned by Ecclesiastical authority. Not only were his views on predestination condemned during his lifetime at the Council of Valence (855) and Langres (859) but also his general system of philosophy in the Council of Paris as late as 1225. There was a special reason for this last condemnation. Pantheism had invaded the schools of Paris in the second decade of the thirteenth century. On the one hand, it sought support in the newly introduced Arabian commentaries on Aristotle, and on the other hand it lent assistance and prestige to the active heresy of the Albigenses. It was evident that the Pantheists were inspired by John the Scot. And so his "Division of Nature," which had hitherto been known only to a select circle of mystics, was dragged into the arena of controversy and its doctrines condemned. There can be no doubt that the predestination doctrine, with its reduction of evil to mere appearance, was contrary to the doctrine and practice of the Church; there can be no doubt either that the "Division of Nature" contains pantheism. In one sense, therefore, John the Scot deserved to be condemned as a heretic. But, in another sense is it possible still to argue the question "Was he a heretic?"

The Church condemns heresy because she consistently maintains that a sin against the truth is an offense against the God of truth, and a crime against the social order, since it leads others into error. She condemns the heretic when he shows disregard for her authority; and here again she is consistent, since she believes her authority to be from God. But what of the case when a man who loves the truth and venerates the authority of God, who never dreams of being a heretic, nevertheless proclaims a doctrine which the Church believes to be false? Then the heresy is condemned because the spread of false doctrine would work injury to the body social and because in itself what is false, like what is foul, is worthy of condemnation. In this case, however, where there is no contempt or obstinacy on the part of the heretic, the Church does not venture to forestall the verdict of the Supreme Judge. *Ecclesia non judicat de internis*. Now, if ever there was a heretic who

erred in good faith it was the courageous Irishman who in the ninth century ventured into the regions of metaphysics and theology with no one to advise him of the danger ahead, nay not only voyaged through uncharted seas but sailed with the danger signals so set that he could not escape disaster.

Consider first how implicitly he trusted his author, the Pseudo-Dionysius. There, he thought, he had to deal with a disciple of the Apostle himself, one who spoke with authority on all subjects ecclesiastical and theological. The subtlety of his metaphysics was no indication that the false Dionysius was an unsafe guide. To the spiritual imagination of the ardent Irish philosopher all that appealed with compelling force. John had not the least suspicion that he was guilty of heresy. In his pamphlet against Gottschalk he showed how severely he would deal with anyone that troubled the serene waters of orthodoxy or sought to sow the tares of false doctrine amid the wheat of genuine dogmatic teaching. With the crudeness which characterized that age, he recommends that the heretic be burned with tar and pitch. Of course he would not be first—nor the last—to condemn very strongly in others a fault of which he himself was guilty. But may we not rather say that he was not guilty, in intention, of setting up his authority against that of the Church, but that his very piety and his devotion to truth misled him? On more than one point he reformed his teaching in order to conform to the decisions of the official Church. If his devotion to the Pseudo-Dionysius betrayed him into pantheism, there was none among his contemporaries to warn him of the danger, and he erred in circumstances of such exceptional good faith that we cannot but repeat the words of his first editor "*Potuit, ergo, errare; haereticus esse noluit*: He could indeed be wrong, he never meant to be heretical."

This point deserves to be accentuated here because our heart goes out naturally and sympathetically to this brave venturesome spirit. There was in his case a combination of courage and ability which resulted in an originality unique in early medieval times. While all his contemporaries were content with reproducing the past, marking time without advancing, he

had the heart as well as the brain to conceive and execute a great, imposing, original system of Christian theology and spiritual metaphysics. From his contemporaries he received little praise and very much adverse criticism. For, though the legend is certainly false according to which he was put to death at Malmesbury by his pupils who stabbed him with their pens, reliable history shows how he suffered at the hands of his contemporaries in the controversies of the day. And he has not fared much better at the hands of modern critics. By some he is dismissed as a dangerous heretic, the leader of an anti-scholastic movement, a disturber of the peace of the household of the faith. By others he is exalted into a hero of revolt, and is credited with a rationalism which he would have been the first to repudiate. The truth is seen to lie between these two extreme opinions. It is seen especially in his great work "On the Divisions of Nature." At the very outset of that work he defines the relation between theology and philosophy, between revelation and reason, in a manner that shows him to be more of a mystic than a rationalist. Had he placed reason above authority he would have been a rationalist. Far from doing that, however, he places divine illumination so far above reason that he is a thorough mystic. It is true, he uses the phrase "Every authority that is not approved by reason is weak" (*De Div. Nat.* I, 69, cal. 513). But that is the opinion even of the most orthodox. No authority in matters of faith can compel assent unless it is radically reasonable. What distinguishes John the Scot is the view that reason itself must be illumined from on high in order to understand the profound truths of philosophy. It was a sublime thought of his to interpret in that sense the scriptural saying "Every good gift is from above." The greatest perfection of the human mind, he says, is knowledge. But no mind can attain knowledge, especially knowledge of higher spiritual truths, unless he receives light from the Source of all Light. (*Super Hierarch. Cel.* col. 127). To that Light he himself turned constantly with simple piety and devout reverence. To it, so to speak, he appealed his own case. For, at the end of his work he intimates

that he is aware of the possibility of being misunderstood. "If these compositions," he says, "fall into the hands of right minded philosophers, they will receive a hearty welcome and affectionate reception. But if they fall into the hands of those who are more prompt to find fault with what is ill than to approve of what is well done, with such people one should not engage in much contention. Let each abound in his own sense until that light shall dawn to which the light of false philosophy is as darkness, and which changes into light even the darkness of minds which are right in philosophy" (col. 1022).

To that final judgment, then, let us appeal his case. He had his small circle of friends and fellow Irishmen at Laon, among whom he worked and by whom he was, no doubt, understood. In the world of public affairs he took no part, in the polemics in which he did take part he was abused and misrepresented. Silently and mysteriously he disappeared from among the men and affairs of his own day. His great work on metaphysics practically disappeared too. Here and there, however, it was known and appreciated especially by men of kindred spirits, the mystics of the Cistercian order. It was only when its pantheism was brought out crudely and aggressively in the first decades of the thirteenth century that it fell under the ban of the Church. Meantime, Eriugena's work had been done. He had stimulated a few thinkers here and there who could overlook his errors in view of the tender and devout spirituality of the man. Their verdict, I think, should be ours. We should think of him, not as a heretic consciously contemptuous of authority, but as a man of unusual spiritual endowment, kin to some of us in blood, and of spiritual kinship with all who appreciate the higher things of life. His spirit has long since found the light which it sought, and if the reading of his work on metaphysics has not illumined, as he hoped it would, the generations that came after him, the simple, genial, trustfulness of his nature has been an inspiration to many a soul in search of truth. One of these, a distinguished Anglican scholar has taken the trouble to translate from the writings of John the Scot a passage which he calls "The Student's Prayer."

“Assuredly the Divine Clemency suffereth not those who piously and humbly seek the truth to wander in the darkness of ignorance, to fall into the pits of false opinions, and to perish in them. For there is no worse death than the ignorance of truth, no deeper whirlpool than that in which false things are chosen in the place of the true, which is the very property of error . . . Wherefore, we ought continually to pray and to say ‘God, our salvation and redemption, who hast given us nature, give us also grace. Manifest thy light to us, feeling after Thee and seeking Thee in shades of ignorance. Recall us from our errors. Stretch out Thy right hand to us weak ones who cannot without Thee come to Thee. Break the clouds of vain phantasies which suffer not the eye of the mind to behold Thee in that way which Thou permittest those that long to behold Thy face, though it is invisible, which is their rest, the end beyond which they crave for nothing, seeing that there cannot be any good beyond it that is higher than itself.’”

The man who prayed thus loved the light. But he loved it, not as a rationalist who knows no light expect that of his own reason. He loved the light as the great mystics loved it, the light supernatural, the light that is not the cold, clear light of science, but the warm and warmth-giving light of mystic contemplation and love of God. To us his life was dark, his personality mysterious. And such they will always be. For, it is vain to hope that anything more can be known about him. Except by the student of his works. To such a one he appears as a lover of light, an optimist, a spiritual visualist, a subtle reasoner, but above all a true seer to whose characteristically Celtic mind the invisible world was more definite and real than the material world is to the man of science.

WILLIAM TURNER.

BOOK REVIEWS.

Motive-force and Motivation-Tracks. A Research in Will Psychology, by E. Boyd Barrett, S. J., Doctor of Philosophy, Superior Institute, Louvain. Honors Graduate, National University, Ireland. Longmans, Green and Co., London, New York, Bombay and Calcutta, 1911. Pp. xiv + 225.

In this piece of experimental work Doctor Barrett has made a valuable contribution to the Psychology of the Will. The method that he has used will probably be the starting point for other pieces of research along the same lines. It is certainly a great improvement over the old form of reaction experiment which was for so long the only method known to psychologists for experiment in this difficult field. Doctor Barrett makes use indeed of the old choice reaction but he does so under conditions that make possible the application of the more recent "Würzburg" method of introspection. The technique of the experiment was as follows: The subject was seated at a small table with his finger pressing the reaction key. Just before him on a specially constructed stand were placed two glasses containing different liquids. After a prearranged preparatory signal there appeared just above each glass a nonsense syllable, which the subject (in a set of preparatory experiments) had learned as signifying a certain liquid. On seeing the words he had to choose between the two liquids and drink the one he had chosen. The period between the appearance of the choice and the reaction was measured by means of a Hipp chronoscope, that between the reaction and the realization of the choice (by lifting the glass to drink) was recorded by a Vernier chronoscope. The liquid in a glass might be pleasant, unpleasant or indifferent. The two chapters from which the book derives its name are those on "Motive-force and Its Measurement" and the one "On Motivation-Tracks." Dr. Barrett thinks that he can roughly measure the motive force aroused by one of his solutions by the percentage of times that it was chosen. Furthermore the reaction time is in general shorter for the pleasant solutions and longer for the unpleasant ones. The reaction time therefore becomes a measure of motive

force. In the chapter on Motivation Tracks it is pointed out that under similar conditions the structure of the choice process tends to repeat itself. This however is only partially true, for the process tends to become automatic. For when one and the same choice is repeated often enough, the psychical elements in it tend to disappear. According to the author the structural elements tend to persist, but from the data as given it can only be concluded that they do not disappear to the same extent as do the psychological elements. As a result of the disappearance of the psychical processes the reaction time diminishes. In the evolution of motivation the hedonic preferences tend to be eliminated, feelings become less and less frequent, motives take on a more and more abstract form until finally the reaction takes place mechanically. This is to be regarded as an economy of motive force—a sparing of intellectual and volitional effort.

Dr. Barrett attempts to make a practical application of his results in a study of the psychology of character. He maintains that all the essential elements of character are present in the choice-process. If this is the case then we have only to analyze this process and rate an individual according to the experimental data that are obtained in his choice reactions and we can write a formula that will express his character. This he even attempts for one of his subjects. In the formation of character he advocates a study of values. "The central fact of the researches we have been describing is that, when a choice has to be made between two alternatives, the choice is quick and easy in proportion as the values of the alternatives are clearly and definitely known." (P. 215). In life therefore we must have our fixed scale of values. In answer to the objection; *video meliora proboque, deteriora sequor* he says that such a thing is indeed possible but exceptional. Successful effort in moral training is to be directed to the intellectual side rather than the volitional. "The dictum of Socrates, that virtue and knowledge are one, bears out the truth of our contention. He who knows the right acts aright. Not that we are to understand this dictum narrowly; but, taking it in a concrete sense it is true." (P. 218). One regrets that the author did not say a word or two to let us know what this sense is. For it is hard to maintain that virtue and knowledge are one without falling into an intellectual determinism.

By way of suggestion one might urge that the author exercise

a little more care in future always to give exact reference when quoting an author. (Cf. *e. g.* pp. 41, 42, 45.) More pains might be taken in proof reading. (Cf. *e. g.* the lettering designating the solutions page 129 ff. and the explanation of that lettering on page 47.) There should be a general presentation of all the experimental data. For when an author makes selections here and there it weakens the evidence and makes it impossible for the reader to check the results.

THOMAS VERNER MOORE, C. S. P.

The End of the Irish Parliament, by Joseph R. Fisher. Longmans, Green and Co., New York; London: Edward Arnold. Pp. xii + 316. 1911.

This is a very remarkable book. Both in its statements and in its conclusions it is eminently calculated to flutter the dove-cots in Corioli. Mr. Fisher is an iconoclastic historian; he shatters the cherished images of the storied past that we have hugged to our hearts, and makes the pet objects of our idolatry look small and mean. What is perhaps more harrowing still to our feelings, he strips our special abominations of all the objectionable qualities that made them loom hideous in the dark backward and abysm of our imaginations and sets them before us as wholesome and cleanly personalities. He plays fast and loose with our loves and our hates. To a generation that has made a fetish of Grattan's Parliament and regarded it as the *summum bonum* of exemplars it will come as a perfect shock to be told that it was an "impotent and unworkable machine," an "unsubstantial stage picture," and "little better than a patent absurdity"; while those who have been taught to look upon Grattan himself as one of the really great Irishmen to be placed in a class apart with Brian Boru and Hugh O'Neill and Daniel O'Connell, will have a rude disillusionment on learning, *teste* Mr. Fisher, that he was a "mere man of words," weak in character, self-contradictory, variable to every wind of political doctrine and expediency, "the tool of an abandoned English faction," and "the architect of the ruin" of his own parliament! One begins to wonder how such a man achieved the distinction of a public funeral in Westminster Abbey,

or why his statue stands conspicuous in College Green to-day. Not less astounding is the attempt to prove that the bribery by which the Union of the British and the Irish parliaments was effected was an everyday exercise of the normal functions of the English governors of Ireland, and therefore deserving of no special condemnation. There are many other respects in which the author runs counter to generally received opinions, such, for example, as his treatment of the Volunteers and his estimate of the character and motives of Townshend, Fox, and Burke, of Pitt, Cornwallis, and Castlereagh.

Enough has perhaps been said to show that *The End of the Irish Parliament* possesses a particularly pungent interest. Written in a spirit, or at least with an air, of dispassionate fair-mindedness and of historical calm, and yet bristling with points of controversy, it appears to me to be so far out of the common that I hope on another occasion to have the opportunity of dealing with it more fully than the space now at my disposal permits.

P. J. LENNOX.

The Complete Works of George Gascoigne. In two Volumes. Edited by John W. Cunliffe, M. A., D. Lit. (London). Cambridge: at the University Press, 1907 and 1910. Vol. I., pp. 506; Vol. II., pp. viii + 600. Price \$1.50 net per volume.

George Gascoigne (1525-1577), a descendant of Henry the Fourth's incorruptible Chief Justice of that name, was the son of a Bedfordshire knight. Having left Cambridge without a degree, entered Gray's Inn as a law student, written poems, and sat in Parliament for two years (1557-1559), he was disinherited by his father on account of his prodigality. A marriage with a rich widow did not sufficiently diminish the unwelcome attentions of his creditors, and so he sailed for Holland and served for two years (1573-1575) under the Prince of Orange. Taken prisoner by the Spaniards, he remained for four months in their hands, but was at length released, and on his return to England devoted the two remaining years of his life to collecting, re-casting, and publishing his works. He evidently enjoyed some degree of court favour, for he accompanied Queen Elizabeth to Leicester's seat at Kenilworth, and devised part of the entertainments provided on that sumptuous

occasion, and is careful to set the whole thing down in full for our delectation.

Tam Marti quam Mercurio was the motto which Gascoigne prefixed to the edition of his *Posies* which he brought out in the year 1575, and to others of his works, and it may be taken as fairly typical not only of the man but of the busy, aggressive, many-sided age in which he lived. He wished to bring home to his contemporaries that he desired fame for his exploits on the field of battle as well as in the field of literary endeavour. His portrait, printed at the back of the title in the first edition of *The Steele Glas* (1576), with the same motto, and showing an arquebus with pouches for powder and shot on the one side and books with pen and ink-pot on the other, illustrates still more forcibly his dual claim for recognition. It is a sad commentary on the vanity of human wishes that neither as warrior nor as writer has he won anything but mediocrity of renown.

Yet, because of his multitudinous experiments in verse and prose, Gascoigne has an assured place in literary history. Mr. Edmund Gosse, while condemning him as one who has not bequeathed "to English literature a single work or even a single line which is now read with enjoyment, for its own sake," has yet, in the same sentence, to admit that he was "an innovator of extraordinary ingenuity and versatility."¹ Hallam, after devoting half a column to him, and describing "the general commendations of Chalmers on this poet" as "rather hyperbolic," sums up by saying that "we may leave him a respectable place among the Elizabethan versifiers."² Despite this damning with faint praise, Gascoigne occupies with some distinction a whole chapter of twelve pages in the third volume of *The Cambridge History of English Literature*, and in a later chapter has three pages devoted by Mr. Saintsbury to one of his works. When to all this it is added that Gascoigne wrote the first English prose Comedy (*Supposes*, from Ariosto's *I Suppositi*, represented at Gray's Inn in 1566); the first treatise on poetry in the English language (*Certayne Notes of Instruction concerning the making of verse or ryme in English*, 1575); the first translation of a Greek tragedy produced on the stage in

¹ In article "Elizabethan and Jacobean Literature" in *Chambers' Cyclopaedia of English Literature*, Vol. I, p. 238.

² *Introduction to the Literature of Europe in the Fifteenth, Sixteenth, and Seventeenth Centuries*, Chap. XIV, Sect. IV, § 60.

England (*Jocasta*, based on the *Phoenissae* of Euripides, enacted at Gray's Inn, 1566); the first English satire in blank verse (*The Steele Glas*, 1576); the first prose tale of modern life (*The Adventures of Master F. J.*, 1573); and the first mask (*The Princely Pleasures at Kenilworth Castle*, 1576), it will be readily understood how worthy his works are of being reprinted in the series of the Cambridge English Classics.

The two goodly volumes that these works fill are turned out in a style that is characteristic of the publishers: good binding, a handsome cover, and clear type, to say nothing of the quaint illustration. The editing has been done in a careful and scholarly manner by Professor Cunliffe. There are three appendices running to 59 pages, with indexes of Titles and of First Lines of Poems. In one of the appendices is given a pamphlet entitled *The Spoylle of Antwerpe* which, although unacknowledged by the author, the editor has no difficulty in identifying as Gascoigne's. Apart from the merits or demerits of the works themselves, students of the historical development of the English language have here a wide field for philological research, which, I am confident, will give ample returns to cultivation. From the point of view of prosody also Gascoigne will well repay study.

P. J. LENNOX.

History of Pope Boniface VIII and his Times, with notes and Documentary Evidence. By Dom Louis Tosti, Benedictine Monk of Monte Cassino. Translated from the Italian by The Rt. Rev. Mgr. Eugene J. Donnelly, V. F. New York, Christian Press Association Publishing Co., 1911. Pp. 546.

Three great figures dominate the history of the Papacy in the Middle Ages: Gregory VII, Innocent III, and Boniface VIII. There were of course many other great Popes whose lives and deeds profoundly affected the course of events in Europe in that period, such men as Leo the Great, Gregory the Great or Nicholas I, but historians dwell more on the achievements of the first-named than on those of any others, and give to them the place of pre-eminence in mediæval papal annals. When history was written from a polemical standpoint and under the influence of sectarian

animosity those three great figures were usually held up to contempt by non-Catholic writers as monsters of corruption and ambition. Better acquaintance with facts, however, and the spirit of impartiality demanded by true scholarship, have brought about a revision of the unfavorable verdicts of the past regarding Gregory VII and Innocent III. Johann Voigt, a Professor of History in Königsberg who died in 1863 opened a new era in the general estimate of Gregory VII. His work *Hildebrand als Papst Gregorius VII. und sein Zeitalter* which was published in 1815 contained such a favorable, even laudatory, view of the much maligned Hildebrand that Clemens Villecourt, bishop of La Rochelle, supposed it to be the work of a Catholic and later endeavored unsuccessfully by correspondence to convert the author. Gfrörer, a rationalist, was so profoundly struck by the works and deeds of Gregory during the preparation of a life of that pontiff that he became a Catholic. The same thing happened in the case of Friedrich von Hurter, the pastor of the Reformed Church in Schaffhausen, who while writing a life of Innocent III became a Catholic with all his family. Hurter, Voigt and Gfrörer not only changed their own views regarding Catholicity but have profoundly affected the general verdict regarding Gregory and Innocent. So far Boniface VIII has not found such vindication. The charges made by his enemies during his lifetime, charges no more severe than those brought against his two great predecessors are still repeated. Dante, to whom he was the Prince of Pharisees, condemned him to one of the lowest circles of hell "where Simon Magus hath his curst abode." In a recent publication in English Boniface is called "a politician, overbearing, implacable, destitute of spiritual ideals, and controlled by blind and insatiable lust of power." If the work which Monsignor Donnelly has made available in English does not lead to the complete rehabilitation of Boniface it will at least serve to counteract in the minds of many people such estimates as that just quoted. To establish in its day truth obscured by passions; to render to virtue its honor and to avenge the opprobrium of six centuries; to inflict on crime triumphant the reprobation it deserves; to serve also the designs of Divine Providence, which does not defer always the cause of justice to the future life, such is the noble purpose which Dom Tosti had in view, and which we also maintain in our work of translation, "The History of Boniface VIII and his times," is then solely a work of historical reparation, a satisfaction due morality and society.

Whatever objections may be raised as to the advisability of translating a work which first appeared more than sixty years ago, on the ground that so much new material bearing on the life of Boniface has since been discovered, were doubtless not overlooked by Monsignor Donnelly, who evidently did not consider that anything which has appeared since Dom Tosti's time, has invalidated any of his conclusions. His true reparation in the case of Boniface VIII may the more readily be looked for, if his critics will peruse the detailed account of the political conditions which prevailed in the twelfth century as set forth in this translation, and try to form a just estimate of the character and purposes of those contemporaries of Boniface whose views have been accepted with such little hesitation by subsequent historians. Neither Dom Tosti nor his translator attempts to evade the fact that the period inaugurated by Gregory VII came to an end in the pontificate of Boniface VIII. His reign marks the beginning of the decline of papal influence in European state affairs: but, though he has undoubtedly suffered from the condemnation which is so unmercifully attached to failure of any kind, his reign cannot be said to have been a failure. It was his misfortune to be elected to the papacy at a time when the forces productive of new conditions had already made such progress that the old order was in eclipse; but he made no compromise with innovation. Some chapters in this work will especially command attention, as *v. g.* that on the relations between Boniface and his predecessor Celestine, *chi fece per villate il gran rifiuto*. While the abdication of Celestine will long remain a subject of discussion, the part played by Boniface, and his subsequent treatment of Celestine as set forth in this translation will unquestionably relieve the Pope from the charge of bad faith, intrigue and self-seeking. Not less noteworthy is the manner in which the subject of Boniface's relations to the Colonna and Philip the Fair and his proclamation of the Jubilee of 1300 are dealt with. The learned translator deserves the gratitude of all who are interested in the cause of truth, for having found time in the midst of so many pressing pastoral and diocesan duties, to translate a work of such historical importance, and for having made his translation so eminently readable. The long list of documents and the many extensive notes which form the appendix add very appreciably to the value of the work and materially increase its usefulness as a reference volume on this period.

PATRICK J. HEALY.

Essays by Reverend Henry Ignatius Dudley Ryder, edited by Francis Bacchus of the Oratory, Birmingham. Longmans, Green and Co., New York, 1911. Pp. xvi + 322.

These essays by Father Ryder, the colleague of Newman and his successor as Superior of the Oratory, are with the exception of two, reprints of papers which appeared in the *Nineteenth Century*, *Weekly Register*, *Dublin Review*, *Contemporary Review* or *Macmillan's Magazine*. Those already known are on Friedrich Spee, a Jesuit Reformer and Poet; Revelations of the After-World; Savonarola; M. Emery, Superior of St. Sulpice; The Pope and the Anglican Archbishops; Ritualism; Roman Catholicism and Converts; On Certain Ecclesiastical Miracles; The Ethics of War; The Passion of the Past, and Some Memories of a Prison Chaplain. The two papers which are here printed for the first time are on Auricular Confession and on Purcell's *Life of Cardinal Manning*. The latter will, it is needless to say, attract the most attention. The editor says this "was never intended for publication, and even the reading of it to a small body of friends was a departure from the fixed habits of reticence which the writer always maintained in regard to the estrangement between Newman and Manning." Because of the peculiar relations existing between Fr. Ryder and the two Cardinals, being the intimate friend and devoted adherent of Newman, and being closely related to Manning—his mother and Manning's wife were sisters—his words on this subject will be all the more eagerly listened to. Without impairing his loyalty to Newman, Fr. Ryder finds Purcell's work a subject for the most unqualified condemnation. "Undoubtedly Mr. Purcell means well," he writes, "he honestly desires to do his duty both by his hero and by the public, but he is without a vestige of literary sense, his fingers are all thumbs, and, in spite of the elaborate pains devoted to every line and shadow of his portrait, the result is a caricature, a splendid monster." The severity with which Purcell is condemned does not arise from any feeling of hero-worship, or because the attack was levelled at a kinsman. Father Ryder himself, analyses the character of Manning ruthlessly but judiciously, and while making no attempt to minimise his faults lays stress on the fact that any attention paid to the Cardinal's minor traits of disposition and temperament destroys the general impression produced by his conduct and purposes. "One great re-

deeming trait there is in Cardinal Manning's character," he said, "which would cover more sins than Mr. Purcell could enumerate, and that is his charity. A charity not always prudent in its manifestations, but always heroic in its intensity; and most long suffering in the persistency with which it attached itself to the least attractive and the least deserving of its objects."

An appendix contains some notes on Fr. Ryder's controversy with Dr. Ward. The essays are all readable and valuable as well because of their intrinsic worth as because they bear on a movement which has passed, but left deep traces.

PATRICK J. HEALY.

Histoire de l'Eglise. Par L. David and P. Lorette. Bloud et Cie. Paris, 1910. 12mo., pp. 285.

This brief history of the Church is meant for the use of pupils in the *collèges libres et lycées*. The practical purposes which the work is designed to serve very justly lead the authors to treat the history of French Church affairs, especially those of a recent date, with greater fulness than other topics. If supplemented by instruction from a teacher the work will undoubtedly be very useful.

PATRICK J. HEALY.

Vie de Saint François de Sales, évêque et Prince de Genève. Par M. Hamon. Nouvelle édition abrégée entièrement révisée par M. Gonthier et M. Letourneau. Paris, Victor Lecoffre (J. Gabalda et Cie). 12mo., pp. viii + 524. 1911.

This abridgment of the well-known life of St. Francis was made with the purpose of providing an edition within the reach of the most moderate purse and in a form more likely to be widely read than the two volumes from which it is drawn. Though the portrait of the Saint as here presented may have lost something in detail it has not suffered in clearness of delineation nor well-proportioned and accurate presentation.

PATRICK J. HEALY.

Le Bienheureux Urbain V (1310-1370). Par M. l'Abbé Chailan. 1 vol. in 12 de la collection "Les Saints." Victor Lecoffre. (J. Gabalda & Cie.) Paris. 1911. Pp. 226.

This brilliant and sympathetic life of a French Pope by a Frenchman, contains much that is valuable and instructive regarding this critical period in the history of the Church. The Blessed Urban was one of the Avignon Popes sincerely desirous of transferring the Holy See to Rome, and only failing because the time was not ripe for such a move. This work ranks with the best in the Lecoffre series.

PATRICK J. HEALY.

The Lectionary: Its Sources and History. By Jules Baudot. Benedictine of Farnborough. Translated from the French by Ambrose Cator of the Oratory. B. Herder, St. Louis. 1910. Pp. vi + 214.

Attention has already been called to the learned work of Dom Baudin of which this is a translation. It is really an adaptation or enlarged revision, containing as it does so much more than was found in the French edition. Several important sections have been added, notably the chapter on the Genesis of the Lectionaries and Evangelaries during the first five centuries. Though the work is brief it has no rival in English. It will be a valuable complement to other liturgical works which are now finding their way into English, and which as no other Studies can, admit us into the very soul of the Christian community life and spirit in times gone by.

PATRICK J. HEALY.

Nestorius d'après les Sources Orientales. Par F. Nau, Professor à l'institut catholique de Paris. Paris, Bloud et Cie. 12mo. Pp. 61. 1911.

This brief account of the life of Nestorius is drawn principally from Nestorian sources, and based on documents many of which are new and all of which are little known. The importance

of any study on Nestorius from the pen of M. Nau will be evident to all who are interested in finding out how far history will have to be revised because of the discovery of new material bearing on the Nestorians, notably the Bazaar of Heraclides, which Mr. Bethune-Baker has called to the attention of English readers some years ago. In addition to the life of Nestorius, many other important questions are touched on in this brochure, as *v. g.*, the activities of St. Cyril of Alexandria in the Nestorian controversy and the history of the Councils of Ephesus and Chalcedon. A second *opuscule* is promised in which M. Nau will discuss Nestorianism. No more interesting question has presented itself to ecclesiastical historians in a long time than this new phase of the history of Nestorius.

PATRICK J. HEALY.

The Charity of Christ. By Henry C. Schuyler, S. T. L. Philadelphia, Peter Reilly, Publisher, 1911. Pp. 177. Price fifty cents, net.

This second volume of the *Virtues of Christ Series*, like its predecessor, *The Courage of Christ*, is not only a valuable addition to the study of the Life of Christ but is also a thorough and scholarly analysis of the virtue of which it treats. There are, indeed, as the author remarks "various and vague ideas of Charity prevalent among us." Natural Charity should be carefully distinguished from the supernatural virtue, and natural Charity itself should be studied in its threefold division, Charity towards God, Charity towards our Neighbor, and Charity towards Ourselves. The duties imposed on us by the obligation of Charity towards our Neighbor all make up the substance of Charity "in deed and in truth," which is the only test of the reality of those inner feelings of Charity which we call Compassion, Gentleness, Mercy. The chapter on "Charity and Ignorance" is exceptionally well done. We can heartily recommend this little book to all teachers and to all who in any way are burdened with the care of souls.

WILLIAM TURNER.

Pioneer Catholic History of Oregon. By Edwin V. O'Hara.
Portland, Oregon, 1911. Pp. xii + 236.

Readers of the *Bulletin* are already acquainted with Father O'Hara's researches in the early Catholic History of the Northwest. Studies already published in periodical publications are here augmented by the addition of other materials and the result is a very readable little volume containing the history of Catholicity in Oregon from the days of Joint Occupancy, in the first decades of the nineteenth century, down to the death of Archbishop Blanchet in 1883. Men of heroic stature figure in the story, and the narrative of their deeds and their sacrifices will be read by all who have a proper appreciation of true human greatness as well as by those whose love of God and His Church predisposes them to enthusiastic interest in events that show forth the glory of both. Father O'Hara, by going to authentic and reliable sources, has put in the true light incidents which the spirit of controversy has already begun to misrepresent. In doing this he has set an example that might well be followed in the case of other states and territories; for it is only in this way that materials for the history of the Church in the United States are to be preserved and rendered accessible. We congratulate him and hope that the success of this undertaking will encourage him to continue his efforts.

WILLIAM TURNER.

The Story of the Old Faith in Manchester. By John O'Dea.
London, Washburne, 1911. Pp. 248.

Like the preceding volume, this is a successful effort to gather and preserve the historical data relating to the history of a particular territory, a portion of what is now the diocese of Salford, England. Chronologically, of course, Mr. O'Dea has a wide field, his enquiry carries him back to the days of St. Chad, or Ceadda, the monk of Lindisfarne, who labored in the Midlands before the mission of St. Theodore to Canterbury. It brings him down to events as late as 1906 and the educational activity of the present Bishop of the Diocese, the learned Doctor Casartelli. Not the least interesting section is that which describes with much detail the scenes attending the execution in 1867 of "The Manchester Martyrs."

WILLIAM TURNER.

MISCELLANEOUS.

An Irish Homily on the Resurrection: Text and Translation.

The following homily is taken from the Rennes ms., for an account of which, as well as of its contents, the reader is referred to an article by Rev. George W. Hoey, S. S., entitled "An Irish Homily on the Passion," in the *Bulletin* for May and June of last year (Vol. xvii, Nos. 5 and 6). It is intended in succeeding numbers to publish four other homilies from the same source.

The title of the one here presented, "The Resurrection of Christ according to Bonaventure," is justified in the sense that it is based on his views as expressed in various passages of his works where reference is made to the resurrection. The ideas of the homily bear a very close resemblance to the Seraphic Doctor's Commentary on the Sentences of Peter Lombard, (Book III, Distinctions xxii and xxv), and to his Commentary on the Gospel of St. Luke, (ch. xxiv, v. 49). The treatment, however, of the text from St. John, "No man hath ascended into heaven, but he that descended from heaven," I am unable to trace in Bonaventure. He discusses the text in Sent., Book III, Dist. xxii, ad Qu. vi, Dub. iv, and in Comm. Joannem, h. l., and gives two ways of reconciling it with the doctrine that all the elect will ascend into heaven, but both are different from that of our text.

The various citations of Scripture are pointed out in the notes. They are generally exact, but in some cases are rather free. The form given to Luke xv, 7, is interesting,—“The soul of one sinner is more welcome to go to heaven than ninety Christians who are in no danger as to their going there.” In the citation from I Cor. xii, at the close of the homily, we find “healing” translated by the same word as “miracles”

in the next clause. If the ms. is a copy of another, it is possible that the first *subailchi* in the text is a *lapsus calami* for *sláinti* or *slánuighti*, due to similarity of the words, occurring as they do in consecutive lines.

It is possible that in the expression, "as we are taught by many truthful proofs of the faith," we may have a reference to Acts I, 3, "To whom also He showed Himself alive after His passion, by many proofs, for forty days appearing to them." Likewise the expression, "He is all-perfect, all-sufficient, all-loving," seems to be a quotation, judging by the preceding words, *da derbadh sin*, "in confirmation of that, in proof of that," which generally introduce a citation. The same words occur shortly before the last long citation from *I Corinthians*, but what immediately follows does not seem to be a quotation from St. Paul, though it may be from some other source.

At first sight there appears to be little unity or order in the homily, but on closer inspection it will be found that there is in fact a logical development of a few simple ideas. The author begins by sketching briefly the incidents connected with the Resurrection,—the descent of the soul of Christ into Limbo, the liberation of the souls of the just, the glorious Resurrection of Christ, the ascension of Christ into heaven, His glorification there, the descent of the Holy Ghost and His activity in the Church. Next follows the development of the idea of the great mercy of Christ, shown by the creation, the redemption of the just who lived before His time and of sinners who were then living or were to be born afterwards, and by bringing all the elect into heaven. Then comes the consideration of the help Christ has given us in the work of preparing ourselves for heaven: the soul was created for heaven; He came to redeem us; to be saved we must worship Him by faith, hope and charity; and that we may succeed in doing so, we receive the help of the Holy Ghost. Next our attention is directed to the power of Christ to save us: He has conquered the power of Satan and prepared a dwelling-place for us in heaven, and we receive His help without fail. Finally, we must prepare our-

selves for the coming of the Holy Ghost, and ask for His gifts; the Holy Ghost is charity, and dispenses His gifts according to His will and our deserts, for the salvation of all, through the service of God and the Church.

However there are many repetitions, and frequent summaries of what precedes, so that the logical order of the thoughts is often obscured, and it appears that we are dealing with a series of disconnected statements made with no definite purpose in view.

Despite their imperfections, the publication of such texts as these is highly interesting if not important, for they give us a near view of the literary and theological learning of the Irish of the Middle Ages, and enable us to appreciate the working of the Irish mind in those times. They are all the more valuable as they seem to be the work not of a brilliant scholar deeply versed in the science of his age, but rather of an ordinary man, presumably a monk, who nevertheless shows an acquaintance with the literature of his subject which, to one who still holds the opinion formerly so widely accepted as to the "darkness" of those days, cannot but be surprising. Moreover, some of the other homilies in this collection, to be published later, place this point in even greater relief.

The text is given as found in the ms., the abbreviations being filled out in italics, and the words separated by hyphens. The translation keeps as close to the original as is possible without requiring a reference to the text itself to discover the actual sense. After the publication of the other homilies mentioned, it is intended to add a list of the uncommon words found in them.

TEXT.

(fo. 30c l. 31) Do-eiseirgi Christ d-eis a-chésta ann so 7 mar dlighomitt a-tuicsin do-rer bonaventura 7 do-tarba a-tuicsina an-ar-craidhi 7 can cuntabairt do-beth acaind co-ndecaid anam Crist tar eis a-paisi an-ifirnn do-tabairt cach-aein do creitt dó roim an-mbas a-hifirnn a-firindi an creidim beó 7 ac-a-roibi credim (fo. 30d) a-sacramint a-fola 7 a-feóla 7 an tres lá ac-ergi do o-n-páis do gab an corp do bí uime roime uime an-tan so 7 ní mar do bí an-corp so artus do gab uime fa-deoigh hé oir do bí sé somarbtha sopianta ría cesad 7 d-eis a-pianta do bí sé domarbtha do-pianta a-mbethaigh mar-tanaig 7 a-cind da XX lá d-eis a-eiseirgi do chuaid a-flathamnus 7 do-hardaighi hé os-cind cach uile creatuir 7 do-shuidh ar-deis dé athar 7 do-foillsighi mét an-tindlaici tuc sé do-na-daeinib .i. a-mac do-tabairt da-cesad tar-a-cend 7 an-a-díaidh so a-cind .X. lá hi cenn adubramar do-cuiredh itir na-hapstoil an-gelladh tucadh dóib .i. an-spirad naem 7 is trit an spirad naem do-cruindidhe an-aen inad eclais nacinedach do-rer examlachta oifici 7 gras 7 tindlaici

7 is é tuicsin na-mbriatar-so adubramar .i. cur an-meitt is-briatar hé .i. in-mét is-mac hé cur cruthaigh sé cach aen-ni co-foirfi 7 cur dligh a-cruthugadh 7 is-é a-adhbar sin .i. gurab é tosach cach oibrighti día 7 cur crichnaid sé cach uile oibriugadh co-foirfi

7 do cruthaigh an-popul co-himlán 7 do cennaig iatt an-a-pais a-comlinadh toile a-athar 7 d-a-derbad sin ata sé ro-foirfi ro-lór ro-dutrachtach oir ata sé ro-lór sa ceim is-airdi do-n medhaighecht indus cor-sín sé a-trocaire do-cum flathamnais 7 do cum-talman 7 do-cum ifirnn g-ar-cennach-ne an-a-césad mar adubramar

óir is-leis do-slanaighi betha suthain cach aein d-a-tainic a-hifirnn in-a-trocaire 7 cach nech d-a-fuil a-talmain 7 is do-eisimplair a-umla 7 a-trocaire do-leighis iad. 7 cach nech d-a-fuil a-flathamnus is-ac-lenmain a-cesta tiagaitt and co-fírindeach.

An céd ceim di so do-roine an-aisced hé do-n-droing do-bí an-ifirnn do creitt and ac-a-fuasladad do cum-flathamnais co-mar-thanach.

An dara ceim oir do bo mó trocaire Christ (fo. 31a) ac dol sa croich do cennach na-pecach na airceas na-pecach ac-iarraidh a-slánaighi oir is mó airces Christ ac-tabairt na-ngras na cach annuain da-mét ac-a-niaraid air

TRANSLATION.

Of the Resurrection of Christ after His passion, and how we ought to understand it, according to Bonaventure, and of the value of understanding it in our hearts, having no doubt that, after His passion, the soul of Christ went into hell to bring from thence into the truth of the living faith, everyone who believed in Him before his death, and who had faith in the sacrament of His Blood and Flesh. And on the third day, rising from the passion, He took upon Him at that time the body which He had before. But it was not as this body was at first that He took it upon Him at last, for it was mortal and passible before His crucifixion, and after His torment it was immortal and impassible in eternal life. And at the end of forty days after His Resurrection, He went into heaven, and He was exalted above every creature, and He sat at the right hand of God the Father, and there was made manifest the greatness of the gift He bestowed on men, namely, to give up His Son to be crucified for their sakes. And thereafter, ten days after what we have said, the promise that was given them was sent among the apostles, namely, the Holy Ghost. And it is through the Holy Ghost that the church of the gentiles was gathered together in one place, according to the diversity of ministries and graces and gifts. And the meaning of these words we have said is that, inasmuch as He is the Word, that is, inasmuch as He is the Son, He created everything as perfectly as it was fitting it should be created; and the reason for that is, that God is the beginning of every work, and that He finished every work perfectly. And He created the whole human race, and redeemed them in His Passion, in fulfillment of the will of His Father; and, in confirmation of that, "He is all-perfect, all-sufficient, all-loving." For He is all-sufficient in the highest degree of measurement, so that He extended His mercy to heaven and to earth and to hell, in redeeming us in His Passion, as we have said. For it is by Him that eternal life is assured for every one who came from hell in His mercy, and for each one who is on earth; and it was to give an example of His humility and His mercy that He cured them. And everyone who is in heaven, it is truly by clinging to His Passion that he comes there.

The first degree of this He did freely for the multitude who were

An tres ceim is-in-gloir a-tigh neime a-comlinad toile an-athar .i. ac-cur-anmann súas an-inad na-n-aingil do tuit anuas ar-son an dimais 7 d-a-derbad so is forbfailtigi aen-anam pecaig do dol and na-deichnebar 7 cetre XXit Christaidhi ar-nach-fuil cunntabairt fan dol ann 7 is-aire sin do chuaidh anam Crist an-ifirn d-eis a-césta do-fúasladh na-n-anam do-bí cengailti ac-a-roibi creittim ann fein 7 is sí ar-tuicsin-ne nar-fuascladh acht iad 7 d-a-eisi sin do-eiridh ó-bás do-tabairt betha do-na daeinib do bí beó an-a-corpaib 7 marb is na-pecthaib 7 an-a-diaidh sin do chúaid a fathamnas do-breith na-broitti do bí an-ifirn leis a fathamnus do-comlínadh an-flathamnais 7 do-cuir an-spirad naem anúas do choimét na-heclaisi talmanta mar adubramar 7 do comlinadh cach-neich is *eigen* do-fuasladh an cinéd daonna 7 an-a-diaidh so ata an-furtacht so fuirechair is-na-daeinib ac-a-fuil doigh a-techt Christ d-a-slanugad sa-breithemnus oir tanic dia a colainn daonna d-ar-cennach 7 tic cach láei sa-n-indtind d-ar-comairliugad 7 tic fos co-deigenach do-cum an-breithemnais d-ar-slanugad mar adubramar

7 cach aen lenus Christ mar so tiaghait leis n-a-flathamnus óir adeir ant-udar nach-tét ní a-flathamnus acht an-ní-tanic as 7 is-í a-tuicsin so ant-anam resúnta do cruthaigh día co-flathamanda do-cum na betha daonna co-tiagaitt an-a-mballaib díse leis an-a-flathamnus 7 is mar sin do chúaidh día 7 a-baill (fo. 31b) le chele a-flathamnus 7 is mar so do chuadar na-baill leis .i. ac-a-adhrad is-in-creitim 7 is-in dóchus 7 is-in grad 7 is é so an-furtacht do dligh cach-aen nech do beth aici ac-a-ullmugad do-fein in día do-cum dola leis a-flathamnus mar adubramar 7 ar-tus na-daeine do creitt do día co-maith 7 do an-sa-creittim sin co-daingen 7 is ar-na-hadbaraib sin do eiridh Crist 7 do chuaid ind-ifirn do-tabairt na-droingi sin as 7 d-a-mbreith a-flathamnus 7 do hoslaicedh dorus flathamnais dé a-pais Christ 7 an-aeinteacht na-toile so do brisedh doirrsi ifirn 7 do lacadh cumachta an-diabail ac-tabairt a-ball fein do día do-cum a-flathamnais 7 is-iat so sa-saegal anois an-drong creitis Christ do-techt d-a-slanugad sa-breithemnus .i. an-drong lenus hé sa-creitim 7 annsa dóchus 7 annsa grad 7 beirid día iat sin a-nglóir na kathrach nemda d-a-suidhiugad 7 is-é do ní an suidhiugadh so .i. Christ ata an-a-duine firindech 7 an-a-día fíre le-r-b-aíl hé fein co-humal d-ar-cennach-ne an-a-páis do-tabairt betha dúinn 7 d-ar-mbreith leis an-a-eisergi 7 ar-na-hadbaraib so do eirig sé

in hell who believed in Him, releasing them to dwell eternally in heaven.

The second degree: For the mercy of Christ was greater going upon the cross to redeem sinners than is the toil of sinners in seeking their salvation; for the toil of Christ in giving graces was greater than any solicitude, however great, in asking them of Him.

The third degree was in the glory of the heavenly abode, in fulfilment of the will of the Father, namely, in putting souls up in the place of the angels who fell thence because of pride; and, in proof of this,¹ "The soul of one sinner is more welcome to go thereto than ten and fourscore Christians [*sic*] who are in no danger as to their going there." And it is for this reason that the soul of Christ went into hell after His crucifixion to ransom the souls that were in bondage and had faith in him. And it is our understanding that they alone were ransomed. And after that, He rose from death to give life to those who were alive in body and dead in sin. And after that, He went into heaven to bring the captives who were in hell into heaven with Him, to fill heaven. And He sent the Holy Ghost down to preserve the Church on earth, as we have said, and to fill each one who is needed for the salvation of the human race; and thereafter this help is watchful among those who expect the coming of Christ to save them in the judgment. For God came in a human body to redeem us, and He comes every day into the mind to counsel us, and He comes also finally to the judgment to give us salvation, as we have said. And all who thus follow Christ go with Him into His kingdom. For the author says that² "Nothing goes into heaven but what comes thereout," and by this is meant the rational soul which God created in a heavenly manner for human life until they go into His kingdom with His as faithful members. And it is thus that God and His members went together into heaven. And thus the members went with Him, namely by adoring Him by faith, by hope, and by charity. And this is the help each one ought to have in preparing himself in God to go with Him into heaven, as we have said; and above all, those who believed firmly in God as well as in Him in that faith; and it is for these reasons that Christ rose again, and went into hell to bring that multitude out, and to bring them into heaven. And the gate of God's kingdom was

¹ Luke xv, 7.

² John iii, 13.

o-n-bás a-mbethaidh nem-marbtha nem-truaillighti mar adubrumar romaind ar-fechain na-meitti do-uairib dlichtecha do-bí sé adhlaicti .i. VI huaire X ar XX do-reir bonaventura ar-eiseirgi Christ 7 is annsa comairem so creitfis cach aen-duine nar-eiridh sé ní istúsca na-sin as-an-adlacad 7 da-mbeth ní bud faitti na-sin ann san-adlacadh adeirtheidhi co-ma-nem-cumachtach hé 7 nach fétfedh aen-nech do-breith do-chum an-flathamnais nemda curab aire sin do-eiridh sé is-in-tres lá sa dochus do-bí ac-na-hainglib 7 ac-na-daeinib ac-comlínadh toile an-athar o-n-mac 7 ní geinter andóchus so choidhechi acht o-n creitim (fo. 31c) firindech 7 o-n dóigh daingin deigenaigh ac dol le Christ a-flaithemnus 7 ní co luath tar-eis a-eiseirgi do chúaidh sé a-flathamnus acht ar-comairem da XX lá d-eis a-césta mar-tecaister duinn a-comarthighte imda firindecha an-creitim 7 is ann sna comarthighte sin daingnigter cach aen acaind d-a-breith a-spas na-catrach nemda 7 an-a-diaidh sin do cuirid an-spirad naem anúas lá na-quincisi do lasadh grada día in-ar-craidedaib-ne 7 ní hadaigter an-tene so a-craidhi aen-duine acht a-craidhi an-tí iaras hí co-firindech mar adubairt ant-apstol nach oslaicter an-doras acht do-n nech iaras a-oslacad 7 is mar sin fuair cach nech ac-a raibi dóchus dutrachtach an-a-craidhi comtidhlaicti an spiraid naem do dail doib 7 is aire sin nach co luath d-eis dola súas do-n mac do cuiridh an spirad naem anuas acht a-spas X lá d-a-eis gurab ann-sa Xmad lá do batar na-hapstoil ac-urnaidhti 7 ac-treigenus do cum an spiraid naem do-gabail cuca mar do-gelladh doib 7 is mar so tucadh an-comarta dlichtech sin .i. ac-a-tangmail an-uairib 7 a-laithib .i. an-eiseirgi Christ 7 an-a-dol súas sa-cathraig nemda 7 ann sa spirad naem do chur anuas 7 a-fundamint tsuidhigti na trinoidi sa-cathraig nemda 7 a-bus ann-sa saegal 7 ac derbad morain do-serbísid ele d-a-ndernaidh 7 d-a-derbad so ata an spirad naem ann-sa gradh 7 cidh b-é marus is-in grad mairid sa-spirad naem

7 ata acaindi a-coitecindi and so re tuicsin curab é in spirad naem an-gradh 7 bun cach uile sacraminti curab aire sin ar-ndul do mac dé sa-cathraig nemda tanic an spirad naem anúas ar-comairem na-haimsire adubramar maille re sacramint na heclaisi mar-tserbistear iat co-hexamail mar ata móran do ballaib ac-seruís an aen cuirp amain 7 na-baill examla ac-denam a-seruís examla ac-comaentugad do-n aen corp 7 d-a-derbad so ar-techt do-n spirad naem ann-sna-hapstoil tuc VII (fo. 31d) sacraminti na-

opened by the Passion of Christ, and, in accordance with this purpose, the gates of hell were broken, and the power of the devil was weakened when God brought His own members to His kingdom. And these are they who, in the present world, believe Christ will come for their salvation in the judgment, namely, those who follow Him by faith, hope and charity. And God brings these into the glory of the heavenly city to abide; and He who established this dwelling is Christ, who is true man and true God and who was pleased humbly to redeem us Himself in His Passion, to give us life and to bring us with Him in His resurrection; and, for these reasons, He rose from death into immortal, incorruptible life, as we have said before, considering the number of foreordained hours He was buried; namely, thirty-six hours, according to Bonaventure, on the Resurrection of Christ. And according to this computation everyone will believe that He did not rise sooner than that from the tomb; and if He had been longer than that in the tomb, it would have been said that He was powerless, and that He could not bring anyone to the heavenly kingdom. So it was for that reason He rose on the third day according to the hope of the angels and of men in the fulfilment of the will of the Father by the Son. And this hope never springs except from the true faith and from the firm and final expectation of going with Christ into heaven. And He did not go into heaven immediately after His resurrection, but on the expiration of forty days after His crucifixion, as we are taught by many truthful proofs of the faith. And it is by these proofs that each one of us is assured of being brought into the realm of the heavenly city. And, after that, the Holy Ghost was sent down on the day of Pentecost, to kindle the love of God in our hearts, and that fire is not lighted in anyone's heart except in the heart of him who asks it in truth, as the Apostle said that³ "The door is not opened except to him who seeks its opening." And, therefore, each one who had earnest hope in his heart, received the outpouring of the gifts of the Holy Ghost, and, for that reason, not immediately after the ascension of the Son was the Holy Ghost sent down, but a space of ten days afterwards. Hence it is that on the tenth day the apostles were praying and fasting in preparation for receiving the Holy Ghost as was promised them. And this is how that foreordained sign was given, namely, by their happening at the times and on the days [appointed],

³ Cf. Matt. vii, 7, 8; Luke xi, 8-10; James iv, 2.

heclaisi leis ac-denam a-n-oifici co-hexamail ac-fognam do día 7 do-n eclais 7 is mar so doberar do-n aen nech amain spirad diada ac-comrad na-hegna 7 doberar spirad do-nech ele ac comrad na-tuicsi 7 doberar creidim daingen do nech ele 7 doberar do-nech ele grasa na-subailchi 7 doberar do-nech ele oibrighti na subalchi 7 doberar faitsine do-nech ele 7 doberar do droing ele deiscribidi a-na spiradaib 7 doberar do-nech ele examlacht na-tengta 7 doberar tuicsi na-comraidti do-nech ele 7 roindter cach aen ní díb so ó-n-aen spirad naem ac-a-tidhlacad a-saeirsi deiscribidi cach aein mar tuilles iad 7 a-tídlacad derlaictech an spiraid naem cédna mar adubrumar qui uiuit 7 regnat deus per omnia secula seclorum. AMEN.

namely, in the case of the resurrection of Christ, and of His ascension to the heavenly city, and of the sending down of the Holy Ghost, and the institution of the dwelling of the Trinity both in the heavenly city and also here in the world, and by the assurance of many other services that He rendered. And in proof of this,⁴ "The Holy Ghost is charity, and whosoever abideth in charity abideth in the Holy Ghost." And we must all alike understand here, that charity is the Holy Ghost and the foundation of every sacrament. Hence it is that, after the Son of God went into the heavenly city, the Holy Ghost came down in the fullness of the time we have said, with the sacraments of the Church, as they are administered in divers manners; as there are many members serving one body alone, and the various members are performing various services in harmony with the one body. And in proof of this, on the coming of the Holy Ghost upon the apostles, He brought the seven sacraments of the Church with Him, performing their various ministries in the service of God and of the Church. And thus⁵ "To one person is given the divine Spirit speaking wisdom; to another is given the Spirit speaking knowledge; to another is given firm faith; to another is given the graces of healing; to another is given the working of miracles; to another is given prophecy; to others is given the discerning of spirits; and to another is given diversity of tongues; and to another is given the understanding of speeches. And all these things are divided by the one Holy Ghost, bestowing them in freedom of discernment" of each one, according as he deserves them, and as a beneficent gift of the same Holy Ghost, as we have said,—*qui vivit et regnat Deus per omnia sæcula sæculorum. Amen.*

JAMES A. GEARY.

⁴I John iv, 16.

⁵I Cor. xii, 8-11; Heb. ii, 4.

The Pierpont Morgan Collection of Coptic Manuscripts.¹

An announcement made privately at the annual meeting of the Archaeological Institute of America in Pittsburgh December 28, 1911, and here published for the first time will be accepted by students of exegesis and scholars and collectors of ancient manuscripts the world over as being of unusual importance. It is that J. P. Morgan has just acquired for his private collection the most complete and most valuable collection of Coptic manuscripts that has ever been unearthed in Egypt and that he intends to put the collection into such shape as will allow the scientific world to profit by the great addition to the knowledge of Coptic literature brought about by this most recent find.

The collection has just been received by Mr. Morgan from Paris, where its purchase from the antiquarians who rescued the sheaves of ancient manuscripts from the Arabs was made. Prof. Henry Hyvernât of the Catholic University of America, who is one of the best known authorities on Coptic literature and who was instrumental in gathering from Arab vandals codex after codex of almost priceless vellum, has done preliminary work upon the collection sufficient to assay the value of the whole collection as a contribution to the world's knowledge of this branch of ancient literature and sacred art. Reproductions of many of the frontispieces and pages of text have been made and the collection has fairly passed through the preliminary stages of editing and collation. Prof. Hyvernât says that it "must be called the most complete and from the point of view of ancient Christian art the most valuable yet known."

In bulk the collection comprises fifty volumes, some of which contain as many as nine or ten treatises by the monks of the ancient Church of Alexandria. Nine or ten of them are still in their original bindings, typical of the severe asceticism of early Christian art. A dozen of the books are adorned with full page pictures representing the Virgin with the Child at her breast, angels, holy martyrs and anchorites of the desert, and throughout the collection there is a wealth of marginal illuminations and text adornments.

One peculiar point of value in the collection is that it contains

¹ *New York Sun*, December 31, 1911.

the oldest dated Coptic manuscripts yet found. These dates range from the middle of the ninth to the latter half of the tenth century. The miniatures and ornate bindings are also the earliest examples of Coptic art uncovered and carry the arts of codex making and bookbinding back further than any previously discovered specimens.

The collection is rich in Biblical manuscripts. It contains six complete books of the Old Testament. These are the books of Leviticus, Numbers and Deuteronomy, the First and Second Books of Samuel and the Book of Isaias. Of the New Testament there are three complete Gospels, of Matthew, Mark and John, an incomplete Gospel of Luke, the fourteen Epistles of St. Paul, two of St. Peter and three of St. John. In the case of all of these previous Coptic finds had been confined to fragments of uncertain age and origin.

When the edited collection comes to the hands of students they will find that aside from the invaluable Scriptures, here complete at least as to the individual books, three liturgical books, unique in Coptic collections and of great importance to the study of exegetics, throw new light upon the liturgical observances of the early church of Alexandria. These are a lectionary, a breviary and an antiphonary all complete.

Apocryphal literature of the Church, which found a fertile field in the Egyptian branch, holds a prominent place in the new Morgan collection. There are treatises on the life of St. John the Evangelist and on the investiture of the Archangel Michael as head of the heavenly host; homilies attributed to St. Cyril of Jerusalem and other semi-mythical early fathers of the Church and numerous biographies of famous anchorites and cenobites, such as St. Anthony and St. Pachomius. Details of early martyrdoms, such as are set forth by Eusebius and hitherto hidden by the mists of antiquity are given in these books of apocrypha.

The story of the recovery of the manuscripts forming the new Morgan collection possesses all the qualities of romance. Wandering Arabs found the great mass of vellum books some twenty months ago in the ruins of what had been the convent of the Archangel Michael in the Fayum district of Egypt.

The manuscripts were hidden in a stone vat as if they had been hastily disposed there by the Coptic fathers in anticipation of a raid by infidels. With them were the writing implements used by the ancient scribes: three ink wells combined with calami cases,

and two of the calami themselves, consisting of reed stems sharpened into pen points at both ends. The ink wells were of lead and designed to contain sponges, once soaked with ink after the custom of the Egypt of to-day.

The Arabs have learned that collectors are willing to pay high prices for the skin and papyrus relics of a past age that are occasionally turned up by chance from their resting place of centuries, and they have come to be shrewd bargainers. It has grown to be their custom during the last hundred years of ardent collecting in the graveyards of Egypt's past whenever they found a cache of manuscripts to tear the sheaves of manuscripts apart and distribute to each man of the party his share of the spoils. By selling the manuscripts piecemeal in this fashion the Arabs have found that they could get bigger prices in the aggregate. Tourists and collectors have been known to pay as high as \$80 for a single fugitive sheet of vellum, while they would hesitate to buy a whole volume at that rate.

Because of this crafty custom of the Arabs many of the relics of Coptic literature collected in the past have been fragmentary and many scattered leaves have been destroyed or lost in the migrations of the original finders. In the instance of the present collection before scientists got wind of the discovery the great mass of manuscripts had been divided among the Arabs who had made the find.

It was due to the energy of M. Chassinat, head of the French Institute of Archaeology at Cairo, and Prof. Hyvernats that the fugitive bundles of manuscripts were all brought together again. This was only accomplished after six months of labor and at the frequent risk even of the lives of the two enthusiasts. To them is due the credit of having preserved the most complete collection of Coptic manuscripts extant.

Prof. Hyvernats gave to a *SUN* reporter the following scientific review of the collection:

"Most of the documents are couched in the Sahidic dialect, the home of which seems to have been in Upper Egypt; but evidently this dialect had spread in the Fayum district as a literary language, at least as early as the eighth or ninth century.

"Many of the colophons to be found at the end of the manuscripts make it clear beyond the possibility of a doubt that the manuscripts were all written in the province of Fayum. Two of the manuscripts are written in the local Fayumic dialect. There

is also a Bohairic manuscript, the copy of the four Gospels. It is the oldest copy of the four Gospels in that dialect."

For the understanding of the layman it should be explained here that the various dialects mentioned by Prof. Hyvernât represent different epochs in the history of the Jacobite Coptic peoples. The Coptic language was an offspring of the ancient Egyptian, or rather the old Egyptian in the various popular corruptions evolved when Egypt as a whole became Christianized in the third and fourth centuries.

The Sahidic (Theban) dialect was that of Upper Egypt and was the earliest language of the Christians in Egypt. The Fayumic dialect, the Coptic speech of middle Egypt, and the Bohairic, or dialect of the region of the delta, seem to have superseded the original Sahidic, but on the point of their historical chronology authorities differ.

The question of priority between these dialects—if understood of the greater or lesser similarity which they bear to the respective dialects of the ancient Egyptian from which they are derived, or of the time when they first came into use as Christian dialects—cannot be safely decided. All we can say is that we have no Bohairic manuscripts or literary monument as old as some Sahidic manuscripts.

The layman also cannot appreciate the enthusiasm with which scientists will welcome the addition of this collection to the store of the world's knowledge of Coptic literature without knowing a bit of the history surrounding the early church in Egypt. The first seeds of the church were planted by missionaries from Judea and Asia Minor, carrying with them the Gospels and Epistles in Greek. The church waxed strong under Roman persecution until Christianity became the recognized religion of Rome and consequently of the civilized world.

Then involved disputes among the churchman upon the physical and spiritual nature of Christ and other dogmatic subjects began to tear the early church apart. The council of Ephesus in 431 condemned the Nestorian heresy, but the differences of the churchmen grew wider and the council of Chalcedon, a city in Bithynia, was called in the year 451. The disputes were carried on with venom and animosity during the twenty odd days of the council's session, everything went against Bishop Dioscurus of Alexandria, and the beliefs held by his people, the Coptic Christians of Egypt, were banned. Thereafter the Copts broke away from the authority

of the church and until the present day under the name of the Jacobite church have maintained a permanent schism.

All of the manuscripts represented in the Morgan collection are of the post-Chalcedon period in execution, though the subject matter of the homilies and treatises on saints and martyrs is of the period proceeding the schism.

UNIVERSITY CHRONICLE.

Public Lectures: Winter Course, 1912; Thursdays, 4.30 P. M.

January 18—"Catholics in the American Revolution."

CHARLES H. MCCARTHY, Ph. D.

January 25—"The Liquor Question as a Social Problem."

REV. JOHN J. GREANEY.

February 1—"Socialism or Social Reform."

REV. JAMES J. FOX, S. T. D.

February 8—"King Arthur and the Knights of the Round Table."

PAUL GLEIS, Ph. D.

February 15—"Footsteps of Dante in Northern Italy."

JOHN M. GITTERMAN.

February 22—"George Washington and the American Constitution."

HON. HANNIS TAYLOR, LL. D.

February 29—"Life and Labors of Father Theobald Matthew."

REV. WALTER J. SHANLEY, LL. D.

March 27—"St. Thomas Aquinas."

V. REV. EDWARD A. PACE, Ph. D.

March 14—"Plain Chant."

REV. ABEL GABERT.

Mr. Maurice Francis Egan, the American Minister to Denmark, will repeat, by request of the President and Faculty of Harvard University, his eight lectures on "Christian Hymns in Common Use" in the winter of 1913.

This course was delivered at Johns Hopkins for the Percy Turnbull Foundation in the spring of 1911.

Feast of St. Paul. The feast of St. Paul the Apostle, patronal feast of the Faculty of Theology, was celebrated on Sunday, January 28th, by a Solemn High Mass in the Assembly Room of MacMahon Hall. The sermon was preached by Reverend John T. Creagh, J. U. D., Professor of Canon Law.

Knights of Columbus Fund. According to the February

Columbiad the Catholic University Fund, which is being collected by the Knights of Columbus, is now close to the \$400,000 mark, and a strong effort is being made to complete the Fund before the next Annual Convention in August.

Lectures. Very Reverend Doctor Pace is giving a course of lectures at St. Mary's Seminary, Baltimore, on "The Priest and Education." Reverend Doctor Turner is delivering a course of six lectures at the College of Mount St. Vincent, Mount St. Vincent-on-the-Hudson, New York, on "The Catholic Point of View in Philosophy." During the Christmas holidays Reverend Doctor Shields gave courses on Education at San Antonio and Dallas, Texas.